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This thesis describes and analyses the operation of the 
urban transport planning process as it applied in the Christchurch 
Master Transport Plan. 
Three specific research areas are studied: 
ll} to describe the process of urban transport planning as 
it operated in Christchurch; 
(.2)_ to identify the nature of the relationship between 
transport and urban development in Christchurch; and 
(3} to assess how this relationship, and the urban transport 
planning process has adapted to change during the course 
of the Master Transport Plan. 
The study showed that the perception of the decision situation 
in the Christchurch case was largely subjective but played a major 
role in the decision-making process. A 'rational' master planning 
methodology was inapplicable, incremental planning decision seemed 
more important to the plan product. 





The provision and maintenance of an efficient network of transport 
routes has long been one of the major concerns of city planners. 
McConnell (1981) cites the co-ordination of the use of urban spaces and 
the channels of movement as 11 ... a functional reason for planning. 111 
Indeed with the modern urban form being a 
11 ... concentration of people and activities such that 
movement and communication among them may be achieved 
at low overall cost, 11 2 
the need for efficient linkages is paramount, and the role of the transport 
planner crucial. 
Modern prescriptive urban planning has indeed recognised this. 
The concept of the city as an 'urban system', with transport as the link 
between this system's component parts, has been a common theme in planning 
literature. 3 The most frequently used analogy in this respect is that of 
the city as an organic complex. 4 Wheeler (1974) went so far as to 
describe the city as an 'urban corpus' within which the transport network 
5 acts similarly to the human vascular system. Such an analogy serves to 
highlight the role transport plays within the urban complex. 
Study Aims 
This thesis attempts to examine the place of transportation planning 
within the broader tapestry of planned urban development in the Christchurch 
1. McConnell (1981) p.3. 
2. Wheeler (1974) p.3. 
3. See for example McConnell, op cit, Hutchinson (1974), p.9. 
4. Geddes (1968) p.142, Abercrombie et al (1943). 
5. Wheeler, op cit p.11. 
2 
region. The aims are threefold: 
(1) To describe the attempts of a range of public bodies to co-ordinate 
the process of transport planning within the Christchurch 
metropolitan area. 
(2) · To identify the nature of the relationship between the forces of 
transport and development in the Christchurch case, over time, and 
(3) To assess the manne~ in which both this relationship and the urban 
transport planning process itself has changed and how these 
changes have been articulated in Christchurch. 
This thesis is concerned primarily with the evolution of a Master 
Transportation Plan for Christchurch (M.T.P.). In this respect attention 
is concentrated upon urban transportation planning in the period from 
the 1950's to the 1970's. 
Thesis Structure 
Urban transportation planning has been described as 
"The appraisal of conditions within the community (leading to) 
a choice among alternative actions within government and the 
alleviation of unsatisfactory conditions through the 
implementation of a chosen action, 11 6 
- it therefore involves decision-making in the selection of a strategic 
choi.ce. Such a process can be represented diagrammatically as below 
(Figure 1.1). 














Adapted from: Friend and Jessop 
(196 9 ) p . 104 . 
Figure 1.1 Urban Transport Planning Process 
This circuit involves interaction between the governmental 
subsystem, where such strategic choices are generally made, and the 
coITTnunity itself, where the 'choice' would be applied. Information and 
influence are passed between these two subsystems. For example, a 
persistent state of congestion in a road network calls for a response 
from concerned governmental bodies. Their decision - whether it be to 
3 
act in a certain manner or not act at all to alleviate the problem -
has its effects felt back in the community subsystem. The process of 
selecting the type of response involves therefore the making of 
decisions, based on available information. 
4 
It is to how this process has operated and the results achieved 
in terms of Christchurch urban transport planning that this thesis is 
addressed. The remainder of this Chapter provides an introduction to 
the general aspects of master transportation planning methodologies, 
after which the study begins to examine how the various elements of the 
model introduced above were articulated in Christchurch. 
The first element - perception of the decision field - involves the 
development of the initial understanding amongst concerned public bodies 
of the type of transport problem they were confronted with. Faludi 7 has 
argued that such perceptions or 'definitions of the decision situation' 
are subjective, thus influencing the range of choices available. Whether 
this is the case in Christchurch will be determined by analysing the 
evolution of the problem and the call for a planning response (Chapter 2). 
The type of response selected is a product of the subjective 
perceptions outlined above. The formulation and comparison of alternative 
courses of action, the changes in the exogenous planning and political 
environments and the choice selected as the M.T.P. 'solution' are 
described in the third chapter. 
Since the planning process itself is not 'immediate' - solutions 
to transport problems are generally not developed and produced 
instantaneously, but rather evolve over some time - then conditions in 
the environment in which such a process operates may themselves change. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine this period of 'lag' between M.T.P. solution 
design and construction. Modifications in the plan solution which resulted 
7. Faludi (1980) pp.28-9. 
5 
from changes in external conditions, are outlined in Chapter 4. 
How the M.T.P. was 'adjusted' to incorporate elements such as the rise 
to prominence of environmental concerns within transport planning (from 
the early 1960 1 s)., the energy crisis and economic downturn (of the 
1970 1 s), are all described. The fifth chapter considers the relationship 
between transport planntng and urban development during this lag period. 
Changing concepts on the spatial organization of the Christchurch urban 
area, and the role of other planning proposals (e.g. the form and direction 
of urban growth). are considered in some detail. 
Finally, the study returns to the aims set out above, analysing 
the experience of urban transport planning in Christchurch and whether 
it conforms to that which the model process suggests. This chapter (6) 
concludes by arguing that the Christchurch example shows that the dynamic 
nature of urban transport planning precludes the making of long-term 
'master' plans. Instead, it is suggested, the planning process should 
be geared to more incremental decision-making and that a Master Plan 
should remain purely indicative. 
THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
Developments in transport modes have made considerable impacts on 
the urban sphere in this the twentieth century, none more so than the 
advent of the automobile. The private car has created a host of 
possibilities and problems in the urban setting - changes on an unprece-
dented scale, notably with reference to urban structure, have been 
initiated. 
The greater mobility and flexibility afforded to city-dwellers 
by the motor-car has freed them from reliance on other modes (notably 
public transport) whilst, at the same time, increasing their range of 
locational choices for a variety of activities. The rise of the suburban 
6 
lifestyle has been a feature closely associated with the growth of car 
ownership. No longer has the city to be compact to minimise travel 
distances. Residential dwellings can now be shifted away from the 
vicinity of factories and noxious land-uses, with the labour force 
commuting daily. The city dweller has now moved out toward the urban 
fringe, to more space and a more pleasant environment. 
The spatial freedom the car has provided for the urbanite has, 
however, served to trap him/her into a reliance on the automotive mode. 
Suburban expansion and the separation of land-uses which has accompanied 
the automobile era, has served to increase both the distance to be 
traversed and the number of trips that need to be made. In this manner 
the automobile and modern urban form are complementary, self supporting 
developments. Working together they serve to reduce the ability of other 
modal options to compete. 
Within established areas of the city however, the advent of 
internal combustion powered transport has necessitated change with 
respect to the nature of transport links. Road networks existed as the 
principal paths for urban movements long before the development of 
motorised transport. As such, in many urban areas these transport 
links were not designed with auto-dominance in mind. In many urban 
areas roads have faced growing pressure from the increasingly ubiquitous 
car. Traffic congestion as an urban malady has evolved as an increasing 
source of annoyance, disruption and expense. 
Increasing automobile generated congestion as a phenomenon was 
first experienced in some cities in the 1920 1 s, demanding a response 
from urban planners and technocrats. 8 This response has largely been 
to assimilate the car into the existing urban scene. From the outset, 
solutions were sought from engineering designs and construction. In 
8. Creighton (1970) p.128. 
7 
America active participation in the provision of urban motorways (or 
11 freeways 11 ) had its beginnings in 1928, with the extension of some inter-
city highways into the cities. 9 Later, in the 1930 1 s, many of America 1 s 
urban areas began to be the first to feel the growing demands upon their 
roading system, and the provision of these limited access, high speed, 
automobile exclusive traffic facilities became more common-place. 10 
The vast scale involved in the provision of such urban automobile 
facilities, combined with the capital intensive nature of such projects 
and considerable construction time, necessitated some form of procedure 
to identify potential traffic problems well before they actually appeared. 
The earliest transport planners were however, restricted in the means 
available to them to predict future demand. Crude forecasting methods, 
generally involving a straight line projection of past trends in traffic 
growth along the routes concerned, were the only tools available. Use of 
such a technique could reveal areas where insufficient road capacity 
existed and in this manner investment could be directed to meeting the 
need, prior to its appearance. 
Refinements in urban transport planning methodologies were soon 
to develop (see summary, Figure 1.2). The comprehensive transport 
studies carried out in the United States during the 1940 1 s and early 
1950 1 s expanded the information gathering process by introducing the home 
interview travel survey. This technique recorded a representative sample 
of all travel by all modes in a metropolitan area. The major advantage 
was that the total travel demand placed on the whole urban road network 
was considered not, as previously, the problem facing one section of 
roadway within that network. This meant that transportation facilities 
9. Whilst the cities benefited from such extensions, they were not 
undertaken specifically to relieve congestion rather to connect the 
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Development of Master Transport Planning Methodology (U.S.) 
(including motorways) were planned as systems, an entire road network, 
including motorways, was considered as a unit. The first traffic 
assignment - in which trips were assigned to a planned expressway or 
network to estimate the traffic volume that would use it - was made 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1947. 11 
9 
Despite such technical advances however, these transport studies 
were still of only limited scope. The plan methodology was still limited 
in that it considered only traffic and transportation. Other elements 
of urban growth and change (such as changes in land-use) were ignored, 
meaning the plans presented an unrealistic picture of the future urban 
situation. 
The publication of Mitchell and Rapkins 11 Urban Traffic: a function 
of Land-use 11 (1954) formally established the link between traffic flows 
12 and land uses. They stated the idea that the physical interchange of 
people and goods was measurably related to activities on the land. This 
concept was first applied in a transport plan in Detroit, begun in the 
same year. 
By estimating a future population for a design year (usually 
twenty years ahead) a host of other elements could also be derived to 
determine the nature of land-use in this 1 ultimate 1 plan horizon. The 
population projection could be translated into numbers of households 
and - using a design standard of average densities - into the acreage of 
residential and service requirements. After subtracting the existing 
amount of development, an increment remained to be geographically 
distributed around the city. The number of jobs needed to employ the 
future population, over and above existing employment, could be calculated 
and land for commercial and industrial needs also allocated. 
11. Creighton (1970) p.129. 
12. Mitchell and Rapkin (1Y54). 
10 
The land-use/transportation planning method was based on the 
planners concept of an ideal future urban form. In this sense incremental 
future amounts of land-use were allocated subjectively to conform to 
planners 'desirable urban form'. The circulation system was then mapped 
and extended to meet these future needs, and possible deficiencies isolated. 
The 'breakthrough' in urban transport planning methodologies, from 
data collection procedures to the consideration of land-use, became known 













Figure 1.3 The master transportation planning methodology 
had been developed for the assessment of the transport needs of whole 
urban areas and specifically to accommodate the needs of private vehicle 
travel and motorway building. In the chapter which follows, the 
evolution of urban transport planning in the Christchurch context is 
examined, culminating with the application of such master planning 




THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT PLANNING 
IN CHRISTCHURCH 
11 Christchurch is remarkable as an instance of a 
city deliberately planned. 11 
Sir Henry Wigram The Story of Christchurch, New Zealand 
Lyttelton Times Co., Christchurch, 1916, p.222. 
12 
From the very outset Christchurch was envisaged as a planned 
city, a tradition which has been largely maintained throughout the 
city's developmental history. And it has been the subject of transpor-
tation planning, or more specifically the establishment and efficient 
operation of the city's road transport network, which has played a 
major role in determining both the speed and shape of local development. 
Indeed it is in the original design plan of the Canterbury 
Association's 'capital city' that the first example of road planning 
is evident (see Figure 2.1). This plan superimposed a grid network 
of streets over the flat area of land chosen for the Christchurch site 
(Figure 2.2}. The chess-board pattern of city blocks so created was 
disturbed only by the roads running along the banks of the meandering 
Avon River, and by the need for a diagonal linkage from the estuary-
port in the south-east, to the main road in the north. 
This original pattern of streets was pre-planned. Street widths 
were to be a uniform one chain (approximately 20 metres) 1 and it was 
1. There was, however, some disagreement on this matter. Surveyor 
Edward Jollie, who prepared the street plan, preferred wider 
tree-planted boulevards on all major roads, but this idea was 
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A Section of Captain Thomas's first sketch map of 
Canterbury, February 1949. (Canterbury Museum). 
N.B. The site for Christchurch was later shifted to that marked 




intended to have construction work completed in time for the arrival of 
the first of the Association 1 s settlers. Financial difficulties, however, 
resulted in delays in the street-works programme and when the city 1 s first 
inhabitants arrived (December, 1850) road construction had scarcely begun. 
This situation provides an early example of the gulf that has existed 
between plan-making and implementation in the case of the Christchurch 
road network. 
This initial experience of the advance planning of road links was 
to go largely unrepeated as the city grew in population and areal extent. 
As many settlers opted to settle outside the boundary of the original 
city - in areas more suited to farming and other needs 2 - so the 
necessity for transport links to the 'capital 1 grew. Such links were not 
so much 'planned 1 as 1 required 1 to serve existing demand. These routes 
assumed a radial nature, linking outer settlements to the central grid. 
The establishment of these links was, in turn, to provide a further impetus 
for commercial and residential development along their lengths. As a 
result ribbon sprawl became an early feature of Christchurch (e.g. Papanui, 
Lincoln and Riccarton Roads). 
Within the outer settlements themselves, roading development was 
being largely provided as and where it was needed. Such 11 reactive 11 road-
building was the result of the Canterbury Provincial Council 1 s channelling 
of needed finances exclusively to the streets of the main Christchurch 
settlement (within the town belts) and their associated radials. 3 Faced 
with such a situation most settlers outside the town belts contented 
themselves by establishing private accessways to the nearest radial 
artery. Later these private routes were often conveyed as public roads, 
2. Such as timber supply in the Papanui district. 
3. The provincial council took over local government responsibilities 
and functions from the Canterbury Association in 1853. 
16 
the most notable examples being the many narrow streets and lanes in the 
Sydenham and St. Albans districts, many of which remain today. 4 
Even after the ad hoc District Roads Boards assumed authority 
for road provision in 1863, the haphazard nature of road development 
did not cease. As settlement continued through the early decades of 
the colony's existence many formerly rural sections were further 
subdivided. Part of this process included, of necessity the laying out 
of street access, a task left to the developer himself. Moreover, the 
Roads Boards, inhibited by cost factors (notably that the rates obtained 
were insufficient to pay for all the work needed and the high cost of 
land purchase5) often found they had to appeal to the local residents 
themselves, in order to get the necessary contributions to undertake 
road construction. In such situations, where residents were willing and 
able to pay, the work was done (e.g. Winters Road; St. Albans). 
11 Where the Board refused to undertake the forming and 
improvement of roads residents themselves had to do 
the work. 11 6 
By the turn of the twentieth century the basic skeletal nature 
of Christchurch's radial network had become established. This street 
system and the city growth pattern associated with it, were further 
enhanced by the introduction of public transport. From the introduction 
of the city's first tramway (1879) to the 1920's middle class house-
holds had moved outward along the tramway routes. 7 This reinforced 
the radial pattern of city growth. The decades to follow were to see a 
further extension of this development process, with infilling, between 
these radial streetcar suburbs taking place. This was to further 
necessitate the extension and expansion of the tramway network. By 1927 
4. See Morrison, (1948) p.29 and Banks (1980) pp.93-5. 
5. Banks (1980) pp.97-98 - the rate was insufficient due to the expansion 
of roading exceeding rate increases. 
6. Ibid, p.99. 
7. Bedford and Sturman (1983) p.331. 
17 
the length of track stood at 54 miles (87 kilometres) - considerably more 
than that in any of the other major centres in New Zealand. 8 This in 
itself presented a problem to the local Tramway Board in that the city 
did not have the density of population to offset the cost of supplying 
the $ervice. 
It was not however until the later 1920's that further significant 
changes in the local transportation planning scene began to be felt. 
These changes derived primarily from two sources. The first involved 
the increasing reliance of the Christchurch populace on the motor vehicle. 
The importation of the first car into the South Island had occurred 
immediately before the end of last century, and whilst slow to become 
established, motorised transport grew considerably in popularity after 
the First World War. This took place largely at the expense of the 
previously more conventional modes (see Figure 2.3) . 
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Growth in motorized transport in Christchurch immediately 
after World War I. 
8. Christ.church Tramway Board (1927) p. 37. 
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The 11 Report upon City Highways and Bridges, 1928 11 identified traffic 
congestion as a growing problem. A number of causes of this problem 
were highlighted including the effect of tramcars occupying road space, 
the concentration of traffic at intersections, variations in road widths 
and roadside parking. The Report advocated improvements to a number 
of streets in the city area, such that they might act as relief roads 
for the arterials already experiencing some form of congestion. The 
Report also provides the first example of road planning with the motor-
car i.n mind. 
The author of this report - City Engineer A.R. Galbraith - saw 
the princtpal solution to the congestion problem in the possibilities 
opened up by the 1926 Town Planning legislation. Galbraith recognised 
the place of some form of normative planning in the Christchurch context. 
When commenting on the arterial road system and traffic circulation, he 
stated: 
that: 
11 In order to discover the places that suffer from undue 
pressure, and the origin of its causation, it should be 
set out diagrammatically as existing and compared 
similarly with its ideal solution. Such [an] ideal will 
doubtless be more or less modified by local conditions 
but the salient advantage of this method is that the 
diagrams def~ne and concentrate attention upon the 
objective. 11 
To the role of town planning in this process he noted further 
11 
... the sooner the Town Planning Scheme or 11 Layout 11 is 
placed on a definite and proper basis so that the 
position can be seen clearly ahead, the better it will 
be for all 1Bncerned, and the development of the City 
generally . 11 
9. Galbraith (1928) p.50 - by 'diagrams' Galbraith is referring to 
maps of congestion points within the existing network. 
10.Ibid, p.51. 
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Such recommendations were however, to go unheeded. No town 
planning scheme was ever fully developed in Christchurch (nor for that 
matter, most of the rest of the country) 11 due to a variety of reasons. 
These included a lack of strength of the legislation (the powers of 
the 1926 Act were permissive rather than obligatory on Local Authorities), 
problems of implementation of the Act itself (a whole Town Plan had to 
be produced and approved, not just sections of a plan - this was a 
mammoth task for local authorities), and financial difficulties during 
th D . 12 e epress1on era. 
Whilst the town planning ideals languished in the period up to 
the Second World War, a revival - with a somewhat altered emphasis - was 
to take place in Christchurch during and immediately after the war. 
The continued peripheral expansion of the city (urban sprawl), with 
its consequent over-running of valuable farmland and stretching of the 
resources of public utilities (e.g. water supply, electricity, gas, 
sewerage disposal), had heightened awareness of the need for co-ordinated 
planning in the Greater Christchurch area. Moves toward a region-wide 
planning tier - a possibility encompassed within existing legislation13 -
were begun at a meeting convened by the Chamber of Commerce in 1941. 
This was followed two years later by the establishment of a Metropolitan 
Planning Committee, and the preparation of a co-ordinated city planning 
scheme was begun with some assistance from local authorities. 14 
The Committee's aim was to plan for an expansion in the total 
Christchurch population to 250,000, within a time frame of twenty-five 
15 years. Transportation issues again occupied much of the Committee's time: 
11. Only 13 councils had managed to prepare and have finally approved, 
a Town Planning Scheme under this Act - see Robinson (1968) p.3. 
12. N.Z. Parliamentary Debates, Volume 299, (1953) pp.688-93. 
13. See 1929 Town Planning Amendment Act. 
14. Christchurch City, Lyttelton and Riccarton Boroughs, Waimairi, 
Heathcote, Paparua and Halswell County Councils all co-operated in the 
task of Scheme Preparation. 
15. Christchurch Metropolitan Planning Committee (1948) p.25. 
11 The street pattern ... is unquestionably the 
most impoctant single factor in a town planning 
scheme. u lb 
20 
However, on the question of traffic congestion the final report was to 
conclude that the existing road network - with only minor extensions 
(Figure 2.4) - would be adequate to meet movemenet needs throughout the 
twenty-five year planning period. 
By 1953, with the problems of the earlier Act obvious, another 
piece of planning legislation was being prepared for the statute books. 
This Act (the 1953 Town and County Planning Act) asserted the demand for 
compulsory district planning and the provisions allowing consenting local 
authorities to combine to produce broader regional guidelines. In 
Christchurch this latter challenge was quickly adopted. The Metropolitan 
Planning Committee, made up largely of a conglomerate of local authority 
and civic groups was replaced by a formally constituted Christchurch 
Regional Planning Authority (C.R.P.A.) composed of local authority 
t t
. 17 represen a ives. 
The new Regional Planning Authority's principal task, as defined 
in the 1953 Act, involved the preparation of a co-ordinated plan for all 
major aspects of development within the Regional boundary. This 
Regional Scheme was to then serve as a reference point to which the 
individual local authorities were required to turn when preparing 
District Schemes. However, since the C.R.P.A. had only limited planning 
resources at its disposal, the preparation of the Regional Scheme was 
divided into various sections. The establishment of a rural zone as the 
first section of the Regional Scheme was defined as the first priority 
and, as a result, the consideration of transport issues on a region-wide 
basis was temporarily shelved. 
16. Christchurch Metropolitan Planning Committee (1948) p.17. 
17. The Regional Planning Authority area encompassed all of the 
Christchurch City, Riccarton Borough, Waimairi and Heathcote County 
Councils, and parts of both Paparua and Halswell Counties (see 
Figure 2.5). 
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This situation did not, however, last long. Agitation for 
Christchurch authorities to begin planning major road works was corning 
from central government sources, as a response to the continued rates 
of growth in motor vehicle usage. The newly formed central highway 
authority - the National Roads Board (N.R.B.) - sought the co-operation 
of the C.R.P.A. tn developing a plan for the extension of major state 
highways into the local built-up area. 18 In a reflection of overseas 
experience such highway development was viewed by the Board as a means 
to combat urban traffic congestion - a problem Christchurch was already. 
experiencing. 19 A New Zealand example of urban highway planning already 
existed by this time in Auckland, and this was in the forefront of the 
N.R.B. 's mind when it suggested a similar scheme should be begun in 
Christchurch. 
The N.R.B. in assessing the needs for the state highway network 
had already examined the place of Christchurch in their plans. As such 
their highway planning recommendation to be considered by the local 
authorities was accompanied by a plan for the construction of the 
. 20 northern and southern motorways up to the existing urban fringe. In 
a sense this latter move imposed the need for motorway planning, or at 
least the consideration of broader transport issues, on the local 
authoriti.es. Such consideration would of necessity, take place at a 
metropolitan wide scale - not only due to the transportational needs but 
also the urban development implications that might result from these. 
The C.R.P.A. therefore appeared the logical choice to undertake 
the task at hand. This was confirmed by the establishment of a Traffic 
18. See "The Press 11 14 August 1956, p. 12. 
19. In "The Press 11 November 22, 1955, p .1, the results of a survey were 
released which revealed Riccarton Road to be the country's second 
busiest roadway. 
20. The Press, 14th August, 1956, p.12. 
23 
and Transport Sub-committee of the Authority in October 1956, following 
a recommendation from all concerned local councils. 
A MASTER TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR CHRISTCHURCH 
Reading and transport issues had been forced back on the 
regional agenda. The terms of reference given the Traffic and Transport 
Sub-committee were to: 
11 
••• make recommendations about traffic facilities, 
their type, form and location so that the transport 
of goods and ~Iople may be carried out as efficiently 
as possible." 
In this they were charged not only with the consideration of the 
highway needs, but also with examining the whole urban transport 
question as it pertained to Christchurch. The traffic and transport 
issue was to be considered from the C.R.P.A. 's broader planning outlook. 
The 11 problem 11 had been framed in the context of the whole Christchurch 
road network. 
It appears the local authorities, in providing for regional 
consideration of the issue at hand, had themselves realised that a new 
approach to transport planning was now required. As they were to later 
comment, piecemeal adjustment to congestion problems where and when they 
arose was unsatisfactory, being simply a transference of the problem 
spatially in the network. 22 What was required in the new context, 
was a holistic outlook, approaching the network as a complete system. 
Furthermore, such an approach would point toward a complete solution 
in one broad sweep, which it was thought would also reduce 'wasteful 
expenditure on unco-ordinated projects. 
That a 'problem' did exist, or at least was imminent, had 
apparently been assumed from the outset of the Sub-committee's 
21. C.R.P.A. Traffic and Transport Sub-committee Minutes p.8 (19th 
October, 1956). 
22. Ibid, (5th September 1958) p.263. 
existence. Confirmation of this was finally received with the 
announcement of the results of a cordon-count survey, undertaken 
by the C.R.P.A. in March 1957. When the figures from this survey 
were compared to those from a similar count five years previously, 
they indicated a traffic increase during that period of thirty-five 
per cent. 23 This led the Sub-committee to conclude: 
"That though Christchurch has no critical 
problems at the present time, it may be on 
the threshold of a major one. 11 24 
24 
After further investigation of the scope of this problem, a further 
meeting of local authorities within the region was called. At this 
meeting (September 1958) the Sub-committee announced its recommendation 
that a comprehensive study of the traffic situation be begun. This 
recommendation combined with the previously announced N.R.B. policy to 
25 pay for arterial routes through cities and larger towns, resulted 
tn the acceptance of the M.T.P. study for the Christchurch region. 
A Traffic and Transport Advisory Committee under the C.R.P.A. was 
formed, comprising representatives from local bodies, government 
departments and road user organizations (e.g. Automobile Association 
and Road Transport Workers Union), whilst a Technical Sub-committee 
was also formed to consider engineering and other specialist planning 
26 aspects. 
THE PLAN-PROCESS BEGINS 
With this administrative structure established (see Figure 2.6), 
the first task in the planning process was to begin the collation of 
23. The Press, 23 March, 1957, p.8. 
24. Traffic and Transport Sub-committee Minutes p.142 (20th June 
1957). 
25. The Press, 28th August, 1957, p.16. 
26. C.R.P.A. Annual Report 1959-60, p.23. 
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relevant information on the local traffic situation. This exercise was 
itself to be undertaken along two major lines. 
The first of these involved the collection of data on existing 
traffic and travel patterns. A variety of survey techniques were used 
to obtain this information including the use of a home questionnaire, 
questionnaire for public transport users, interviews of vehicle 
occupants and vehicle counts at a number of points. 27 This data was 
then analysed to provide an outline of movement patterns - the number 
and types of vehicles used, their origins and destinations - within 
the urban area for this 1959 'base year'. 
The second major approach to data collection involved a 
broader consideration of regional time series statistics. In this 
sense transportation had been recognised as a derived demand - movement 
did not take place in isolation, rather trips were made for particular 
purposes be it work, shopping, recreation or other activities. The data 
collected therefore concentrated on trip generation variables, including 
figures for population, employment and a land use assessment. Informa-
tion on vehicle ownership rates in the region, and overseas trends in 
thts respect, were also collected. 
The accumulation of such a substantia) data base took some time, 
however with its collection the planning process could be further 
advanced. The second task facing the planners involved the estimation 
of future traffic trends with 1980 being chosen as the M.T.P. 's planning 
horizon. The forecasting procedure was initiated with the derivation of 
a mathematical formula which related the travel patterns for 1959 with 
the trip generation variables for t9µt same year. Using estimates of 
I 
the values of these same traffic ~eneration variables for the planning 
27. The survey process has been comprehensively covered in 
Johnston l1965), Chapter 3. 
horizon year (1980)~8 the formula was again put to use to predict the 
amount of future travel. From this an overall traffic growth factor 
of 2.22 was derived for total city traffic volume over the following 
twenty years (1959-80). 
27 
Having determined the numerical extent of future traffic, the 
question of its spatial distribution and whether such volumes would 
result in congestion through the road network, remained to be assessed. 
This was the spatial component of the future traffic 'problem' and its 
assessment was based on further estimates of land-use characteristics 
for the forecast year. Such estimates would provide an insight into 
possible trip patterns in 1980. 
The assignment of 1980 traffic volumes to the 1959 street network 
(without any street changes) sought to further clarify the spatial 
picture. Each predicted 1980 trip was assigned to a traffic route, based 
on the assumption that the most direct and convenient route for each 
journey would be taken. 29 This process was undertaken using a method 
developed in America (the Fratar method). 30 
The assignment produced (Figure 2.7) presented a picture of 
severe overloading on the existing network (Figure 2.8) particularly 
with regard to the radial approaches to the central city. The spatial 
nature of the transport problem had been confirmed. What now lay ahead 
was the "real problem" - how best to meet the deficiency that had been 
revealed. 
28. Population estimates predicted a 58% rise in regional population 
between 1959 and 1980, (196,000 people to 311,000) employment 
was seen as rising by a similar amount (from 70,000 to 114,000) 
whilst motor-vehicle ownership would expand by 129% from 66,000 
to 152,000 vehicles. See M.T.P. Report No.47, p.2-3, November, 
1961. 
29. The possibility of congestion-delay influen<;:ing trip routing 
was purpose}y 'ignored. See M.T.P. Report No. 47 (November 1961) 
p.2-3. 
30. Refer to M.T.P. Report No. 46, p.1. (October, 1961). 
28 
Source: M.T.P. Report No.47 (Nov.1961) p.20. 
Figure 2.7 1980 traffic assignment to 1959 street network. 
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Source: C.R.P.A. (1962) 
Figure 2.8 1980 Congestion Situation on the Radials 
30 
DEVISING A SOLUTION 
The completion of the inventory and forecasting stages of the 
M.T.P. marked what was to be a significant watershed in the course of 
transport planning in Christchurch. Up until this time, the lack of an 
accurate data-base had prevented any detailed consideration of the type 
of response required to meet the city's assumed future traffic problem. 
The completion of the Regional Planning Authority report 11 A Discussion 
of the 1980 Trafftc Situation and its Implications 11 (November 1961) 31 
meant, however, a point of transition had been reached in the process of 
plan formulation. With the stage of problem presentation effectively 
complete, planning attention could be focussed upon the type of solution 
needed. 
This is not intended to suggest, however, that consideration of 
the city's future transport needs had been completely stalled in the 
period prior to the production of this report. On the contrary, it 
appears that considerable advances had been made in respect of the 
determination of possible policy options. Discussions within the 
Traffic and Transport Committees during this early period in the 
development of the M.T.P. had gone a considerable way in reducing the 
range of practical choices open for final planning consideration. 
Since these early decisions helped largely to determine the direction 
planning process was to take, it is to this sequence of decision-making 
that attention must first be directed. 
As was noted earlier, 32 the course of urban transport planning 
throughout much of the developed world was, at this time, dedicated 
l~rgely to the provision of upgraded transport facilities where demand 
r~quirFd. In Christchurch too, the issue which initially confronted 
31. M.T.P. Report No.47 (November, 1961). 
32. See above, p. 22. 
the Traffic and Transport Committees had been viewed as one of 
determining the nature of transport facilities to be supplied. 33 
31 
In this context the immediate planning task had become the formulation 
of objectives and minimum standards. These had to be clarified before 
the problem of determining the nature of the physical network could be 
addressed. 
Whilst the traffic survey had revealed the extent of the traffic 
problem in purely numerical terms (particularly that facing the central 
city), decisi.ons were still required as to the type of facility which 
would best serve these future traffic needs. Past methods of transport 
planning had adopted a narrow view of the congestion problem but the 
master planning strategy now adopted in the local M.T.P. sought to go 
beyond such an approach. A broader, more integrated view of congestion 
as a problem affecting the whole network, not isolated intersection or 
routes was advocated. The aim of the final plan was to be the 
alleviation of the congestion problem from the city's road system - a 
planning strategy which by its very expression seemed to prescribe a 
radical re-think of the local transport situation. 
ASSUMPTIONS, OBJECTIVES AND INITIAL PLAN OPTIONS 
As with any forecast situation, the process of predicting the 
future traffic volumes for 1980 Christchurch had meant the making of a 
number of assumptions on traffic trends in the planning period. The 
acceptance of such assumptions so early in the planning process, 
necessitated that they be carried on throughout the remainder of 
solution formulation. 
I 
33. Note the original Sub-committee terms of reference in October 
1956 - see above p. 23. 
The principal assumption made in this context concerned the 
rate of motor vehicle usage during the plan period. The number of 
trips per vehicle for the 1980 plan year was assumed to be the same 
as that recorded in the 1959 survey. 34 In effect this meant that 
the planners and decision-makers within the Traffic and Transport 
Committees were indeed ignoring the deterrent effect of elements 
32 
such as congestion itself or a lack of parking supply. The reality 
of people not undertaking trips or changing modes due to the presence 
of these elements, remained unconsidered. An assumption as to the 
nature of travel patterns in this future planning period also limited 
the scope of solution consideration. It was assumed that 1980 traffic 
movements would again reflect the 1959 patterns, although being some-
what larger in terms of quantities. 35 This assumption - made in the 
period before the proliferation of major suburban shopping complexes -
goes a long way to explaining why the M.T.P. concentrated so intently 
~the needs of the central city. 36 
The acceptance of these assumptions as the basis of the planning 
process, however, raises the possibility that the task of solution 
formulation became geared simply to assumption fulfilment. The 
application of such set conditions from the outset, may indeed have 
also reduced the range of possible solutions to be considered later in 
the process. As such the assumptions could have so constrained planning 
thought that they became self-fulfilling. Such misgivings about the 
objectivity of the planning process were to be voiced later when the 
final outline solution was eventually produced (see below p. 47). 
34. See M.T.P. Report No. 47, p.2-3. 
is. Ibid. 
36. Johnston (1965) p.81, in a summary of the 1959 Survey results, notes 
that 40% of vehicle trip origins or destinations fell within the 
area of the Central Traffic District. 
33 
Once the task of determining the parameters of planning - such 
as the predicted future situation and the basic assumptions - had 
been completed, the question of selecting objectives - what the plan 
sought to produce - had to be addressed. The Regional Authority report 
11 Progress on Alternative Proposals" can be seen as being the culmination 
of this latter part in the plan-making sequence. In this report three 
brief objectives were outlined: 37 
(1) that the final plan should provide for the establishment of 
an urban arterial road network, including motorways where 
necessary; 
(2) that the plan provide an indication of the future requirement 
of parking and its spatial distribution; and 
(3) that provisions be made for the development of a rapid 
public transport service for the city. 
Taken together, these objectives were intended to provide the basis 
of a modally integrated final plan. 38 
When considering how these objectives came.to be formulated, 
attention must again be directed back to the beginning of the planning 
task somce five years earlier. 
In Christchurch, from the very outset, planning had been 
concerned almost exclusively with preparing a design for a high speed 
motorway network. It wi 11 be remembered (page 22 ) , that the 
N.R.B. in recommending that a transport study be begun were themselves 
'1 
principally concerned with extending state highways into the city. 
Such a proposal was introduced for the formal consideration of the 
Traffic and Transport Sub-committee as early as September 1957, when 
initial plan proposals were called for. This scheme, 39 produced by 
37. M.T.P. Report No. 50 (February 1962), p.2. 
38. Ibid. 
39. See C.R.P.A. Traffic and Transport Sub-committee Minutes, 
27 September, 1957, p.155. 
Geoff Suggate (a Ministry of Works engineer seconded to the 
Sub-committee as a technical adviser) featured the construction of 
major arterial motorways linking the Northern and Southern state 
highway outlets from the city. The scheme, as might have been 
expected considering its authors background, conformed to 
contemporary N.R.B. thinking in proposing that the motorway link 
should run as close as practical to the city's commercial and 
administrative centre. This, it was argued, would cater for the 
needs of intra-urban travellers whilst also emphasising the place 
40 of Christchurch in the regional and national road system. 
Such a proposal also held considerable advantages in the eyes of the 
local authorities since the N.R.B. would also be involved - thus 
contributing to the preparation and financing of the scheme. 
Furthermore, the scheme had the added attraction of being able to 
be exten~ed in the period after 1980. What this meant was that the 
development of the motorway network - being as it was, superimposed 
over the existing road network - could be further extended beyond 
the 1980 planning horizon. 
34 
At the same time as Suggate's plan was submitted, an alternative 
programme of roading development was also introduced for planning 
consideration. This scheme was another product of the Sub-committee's 
technical staff. Coming from John Nauta, a former member of the City 
Engineer's department and, like Suggate, seconded to the Sub-committee, 
the proposal adopted the approach of road widening to meet any growth 
in traffic numbers. Rather than the construction of completely new 
major arterial routes Nauta advocated the gradual development of the 
40. This conformed to Suggate's view that "In view of the importance 
of Christchurch in the South Island as well as in Canterbury, 
the location of the (highway) outlets should be such that they 
form part of the South Island major highway system with the city 
centre as a focal point. 11 Ibid, 27 February, 1957, p.25. 
radials, as traffic increases dictated, till eventually they achieved 
motorway standards (i.e. high speed, limited access routes). 41 
Nauta introduced a further element to his proposal. He 
expressed the opinion that transport planning had for too long been 
concerned with moving vehicles not goods and people. He noted: 
11 A deterrent to the solution of the problem 
(relief of congestion) is the fact that 
thinking up to the present time has been 
largely in terms of moving vehicles into the 
central area of Christchur~2 rather than moving 
people and goods into it. 11 
35 
With reference to this he advocated that no motorways should be 
developed in the heart of the city. Instead, a park-and-ride system 
should operate, with commuters parking in space provided around the 
four town belts (Bealey, Fitzgerald, Moorhouse and Deans Avenues) and 
travelling into the inner city on shuttle buses. Such a proposal could 
be further reinforced, he continued, by placing restrictions on private 
v~hicle use in the central area (e.g. parking restrictions, one-way 
streets). 43 
It can be seen that the decision-makers in the Christchurch 
urban transport planning scene, had a clear choice of policy options 
from the outset of their task. One involved a limited car only 
choice, whilst the other a more integrated plan utilizing a number of 
modes. However, before a decision could be made on the nature of the 
.'response to be adopted, it was deemed necessary to begin the comprehen-
sive survey inventory. As such, solution consideration was postponed 
till more information was available. 
When the solution formulation task was again begun in earnest 
in late 1961, the basic choices road widening/public transport and 
41. M.T.P. Report No.12 (September, 1957) p.2. 
42. Ibid, p.l. 
43. Ibid, pp.1-2. 
motorway provision still apparently remained open for planning 
consideration. However, with the establishment of the new administra-
tive structure (the Traffic and Transport Advisory, and Technical 
Committees in late 1958) and the adoption of the master planning 
strategy, the road widening option appears to have fallen out of 
favour. Whilst road widening was 11 considered 11 again, the survey 
results had revealed, to the planners at least, that such an option 
was impractical because: 
11 
... so many roads would require so much widening ... 11 
and 11 ••• it might not be possible to develoo routes where, 
in some cases, they might be needed. 11 44 
As if to provide the definitive rejection of the widening option it 
was further stated that: 
11 In addition it appears that cities in other 
parts of the world, with more experience than 
ourselves, are embarking upon schemes involving 
arterial systems in preference to the wholesale 
improvement of existing facilities. 11 45 
The experience from overseas was used to justify the rejection of 
widening as a choice, and in doing so, strengthened the case for 
completely new motorway route construction. The motorway had become 
this time period's answer to urban traffic problems and Christchurch 
was reflecting the trend. 
36 
The public transport option received a similar fate. With local 
bus service patronage declining in the face of the onslaught from the 
car, proposals for greater investment in this mode became less popular. 
The suggestion that a park-and-ride possibility be programmed for 1980 
Christchurch was rejected with the conclusion that neither the city's 
population nor its layout would be conducive to such a system. Again 
overseas experience was used to justify this conclusion - the Traffic 
44. M.T.P. Report No.50, p.3. 
45. Ibid. 
37 
and Transport Committee technocrats claimed that park-and-ride was 
only successful in larger cities with populations over half a million. 46 
With the statement 
11 
••• we must accept the fact that people will 
increasingly use their own cars, and therefore 
we must try to provide the facilities ... to 
enable them to do so. 11 47 
the planners revealed the true nature of the M.T.P. Based upon 
assumptions of continued vehicle usage, and being concerned from the 
outset with facility provision, the Master Transport Plan as such, 
was never a reality. Whilst its rhetoric proclaimed a modally integrated 
outlook the reality of the planning process never ventured far beyond 
motorway options. The Master Transport Plan had been finally revealed 
as a Master Roading Plan. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the planning 
or 'decision' situation faced by urban transport planners in 
Christchurch, in the 1950's. Urban transport planning had, up to this 
time, been largely 'reactive' - responding to demand after it arose. 
However, the continued rise in car usage in the era after World War 
II - created an impression that the city faced an imminent crisis of 
traffic congestion unless something positive was done to avoid it. 
This, in concert with the development of a master transport planning 
methodology, and the establishment locally of a regional planning tier, 
was soon to result in the initiation of a Christchurch Master Transport-
ation Plan in September 1958. 
46. M.T.P. Report No.50, p.3. 
47. Ibid. 
38 
The M.T.P., as a new approach to urban transport planning, 
attempted to view the possible problem in holistic terms. Not only 
did the spatial outlook of urban transport planning expand - providing 
an 1 integrated 1 study of the whole metropolitan transport system -
b~t the Plan was intended to be integrated in terms of travel mode 
and urban development. 
Despite the integration aim, it appears from the outset that 
existing perceptions of the nature of the problem and indeed the means 
adopted to define the 1 problem 1 , served themselves to constrain the 
range of planning options open. From its initiation - after a 
recommendation for an urban highway study - the M.T.P. looked 
specifically to car-based, roadi ng so 1 uti ons. With contemporary 
overseas experience also concentrating on roading 1 supply 1 through 
provision of bigger and better facilities, the Christchurch Plan seemed 
destined to reflect the trend. 
The methodology of master transport planning served also to 
constrain choice in that it aimed to provide a complete, 1one-off 1 
plan solution. This in itself counted against minor adjustment to 
the existing network, which was discounted on the grounds it would 
only transfer a problem spatially through the network. A radical 
restructuring of the transport network seemed required. 
Even the assumptions incorporated in the Plan method served to 
direct the course of decision-making. The assumption that travel 
patterns in the plan horizon would reflect existing patterns led to a 
car-based solution option. 
Whilst the M.T.P. was intended to be a rational attempt to 
define a transport problem and find the 1 best 1 practical solution, the 




DESIGNING THE PLAN 
Basic Planning principles selected 
With the need for a road based solution established, the task 
confronting the members of the Traffic and Transport Committees became 
one of establishing the basic form the 11 improved 11 road network would 
take. In determining this, planning consideration was based upon the 
concept of traffic canalization. Originally developed in the 1930 1 s 
39 
by H. Alker Tripp,1 this concept involved the devising of a road pattern 
which physically segregated traffic according to its travel needs. 
In Christchurch, the application of the canalization concept 
involved the designation of road facilities according to their perceived 
role within the network. A three tier system of road types was 
2 adopted. The 11 backbone 11 of the eventual design plan was to be made up 
of a primary road system. This was to be designed to perform the dual 
task of moving through (state highway) traffic, and commuter traffic 
loads around the urban area quickly and in large quantities. 3 The 
principal means by which this was to be achieved in the face of predicted 
traffic growth, was via the provision of a system of limited access 
motorways, geared solely to the facilitation of vehicle movement. 
1. Tripp (1942). This concept received most notable application in 
Abercrombie's County of London Plan 1945. 
2. C.R.P.A. (1962) pp.27-34. 
3. The term used to describe the ability of a route or the network as a 
whole, to move large numbers of vehicles without the problem of 
congestion is its 11 level of traffic service 11 • A high level of traffic 
service meant the network was performing in function efficiently, 
low levels meant that congestion was appearing and unnecessary delays 
resulting. 
At the opposite end of the proposed roading hierarchy were the 
local, all-purpose streets. These were streets which served the 
movement needs of their surrounding land-uses - generally private 
residences or places of employment. These local streets, being the 
points of entry or exit to the road network for the majority of 
travellers, were in turn linked to the primary motorway system through 
an upgraded network of secondary roads. Whilst also providing access 
to adjacent land uses, the role of the secondary system was to 
feed traffic into the motorway arteries, at a limited number of inter-
change points. 
The advantages of this hierarchical configuration, were seen by 
4 the planning technocrats in terms of safety and movement. Where the 
40 
largest numbers of vehicles converged - previously the intersections of 
the major radial routes - the proposed new traffic facilities were 
designed to move such volumes with little interruption to flow and thus 
maintaining traffic service. Furthermore, short journeys such as for 
local needs would not necessarily have to enter the primary network at 
all, whilst journeys through the urban area would utilize the motorways 
to bypass the radials and city centre. As such all roads in the city 
network were designed to serve distinct functions. 
With the M.T.P. intended to be a complete, one-off plan for all 
transport needs, other projects - notably those suggested for state 
highway development to the fringe of the urban area, 5 the proposed 
Lyttelton road tunnel ,6 and the importance of the link to the Inter-
national Airport - had to be assimilated into the planning process. 
At the point of physically designing the Outline M.T.P. proposal, 
a top-down planning strategy was applied. In this respect, the primary 
4. C.R.P.A. (1962) pp.27-34. 
5. See above, p. 
6. The Lyttelton road tunnel had been proposed for some years and work 
was eventually begun in 1961. 
network was of core concern, providing as it did the backbone of the 
eventual Plan result. By referring to the projected growth forecasts 
for the various areas of the city, and to the roading needs already 
established (the Lyttelton tunnel and the like) the Traffic and 
Transport Committee planners produced a number of first draft motorway 
location schemes. 7 
Evaluation of the effectiveness of various schemes in 'solving' 
the perceived congestion problem was carried out by discussion within 
41 
the Committee. As such the approach was essentially a subjective assess-
ment of each proposals relative merits and drawbacks in the technical 
sense. 8 All proposals (eight were considered by the time this locational 
stage was eventually ~ompleted} involved various combinations of three 
major routes: a northern outlet, southern outlet, and east-west 
Fendalton-Avonside route. The major differences were in where these 
major features were to be finally placed. Each successive plan was 
intended to improve on the deficiencies apparent in the previous one to 
find the most desirable form for the primary network (see Figure 3.1). 
Following the subjective analysis a full assignment and evaluation of 
1980 traffic flows was made on the considered 'best' options. 
The final outcome of this refinement process was forwarded for 
full Regional Planning Authority approval in September 1962. 9 This 
Outline Plan located the motorway routes on the basis of providing a 
"tangential" approach to the city centre (see Figure 3.2). The concentra-
tion of western suburbs traffic by the former radial network on two entry 
points (Hospital Corner and Carlton Mill Corner), was therefore effectively 
eliminated. 
7. A summary of the various options was later produced as M.T.P. 
Report No.51 (February 1964). 
8. M.T.P. Report No. 50, pp.6-7. 
9. M.T.P. Report No. 56 (September 1962) later published by the 
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Figure 3.2 The Tangential Approach 
In the earliest plans devised by the Committee planners, the 
Northern motorway outlet had been placed on the western side of the 
C.B.D. (Montreal Street and out on a line parallel to Papanui Road). 
However, problems of traffic distribution inherent in this option -
notably low levels of traffic ~ervice along Montreal Street due to 
severe overloading - negated such a prospect. Instead the eventual 
Outline Plan opted for the positioning of the Northern Outlet east of 
43 
the Central City, linking with the Southern Motorway at Wordsworth 
Street (see Figure 3.3). Whilst this seemingly ignored the forecasted 
problem of overloading of the Western radials (refer back to Figure 2.8), 
this difficulty.was to be overcome by encouraging use of the Northern 
motorway by providing large-scale parking along its central section. 
This would result in the centre of gravity of trip destinations to the 
central city changing and the motorway system becoming more attractive 
to travellers to the C.B.D. 
KEY 
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Source: C.R.P.A. (1962) 
Figure 3.3 The 1962 Outline Master Transport Plan 
44 
The Southern Outlet, positioned along the Southern boundary of 
the C.T.D. would provide similar tangential access to the Sydenham 
industrial zone. The location of this route had, from the outset, 
been reasonably clear-cut. Only two locational options, Moorhouse 
Avenue and a Brougham Street line, were feasible. The existing nature 
of the Moorhouse Avenue route, as an all-purpose access road, and its 
lack of a suitable Eastern extension (apart from the already over-
crowded Ferry Road), meant this option proved unsatisfactory. The 
Brougham Street line was therefore proposed. 
The East-West Fendalton-Avonside link was intended to act 
primarily as an alternative to the routes converging at Carlton Mill 
corner. This link extended from Fendalton Road across Hagley Park, 
running parallel to Salisbury Street to link to the Northern Outlet. 
It was expected this route would cater for the predicted growth in 
movement from the airport and Western suburbs, whilst later it could 
be extended into the Eastern suburbs when required. 10 
The provision of such motorways (some 20 miles in all), plus 
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sundry associated improvements to the remainder of the road network, was 
not however possible without some cost being incurred. Construction 
estimates at the time the report was released (September 1962) were put 
at £20 million for the primary system alone, 11 however, expenditure on 
other improvements and the disruption to areas through which the motor-
ways would pass, increased the cost. Although released as an 11 outl ine 11 
only (the detailed construction plans had not been drawn up), it was 
obvious that much disruption to certain suburbs was likely. This 
feature served to create some early animosity toward the proposal from 
concerned residents. 
10. C.R.P.A. (1962) p.31. 
11. "The Press 11 11th September 1962, p.14. 
The M.T.P. had, however, been also viewed as an opportunity to 
rehabilitate dilapidated city housing stock. 12 In this sense, and 
for the obvious cost saving benefits the motorways seemed to traverse 
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areas of low-income housing - placing a heavy burden on the inhabitants 
of these districts. 13 
This outline proposal received the official stamp of approval 
from the full Regional Planning Authority when 11 accepted in principle 11 
on September 4th, 1962. The Authority thereby adopted the Outline 
proposal as its Master Transport Plan. This, however, did not mark the 
end of planning endeavours - on the contrary, much work remained. 
Politically, the C.R.P.A. had now to convince constituent local 
authorities to similarly endorse the plan. Indeed, this was vital 
since implementation of any reading proposal lay ultimately with the 
local authorities. Furthermore, the general public had also to be 
convinced. The C.R.P.A. had to 11 sell 11 the M.T.P. to Christchurch, a 
task which in itself was to prove difficult and time-consuming. 
SELLING THE PLAN - AN OPPONENT EMERGES 
Acceptance of the M.T.P. in principle and the publication of 
the Outline proposals in September of 1962, meant the C.R.P.A. 
effectively opened up the transport planning process to public scrutiny 
and debate. The resultant response was dominated by two major issues. 
The first of the major objections against the Outline Plan was 
its lack of attention to public transport. The adopted plan had played 
down the role of the city 1 s bus system to a minimum, whilst concentrating 
on private vehicle usage. However, the C.R.P.A. was able to counter 
this criticism of its Outline Plan by stating, in reply to such claims, 
12. Early reference to the urban renewal possibilities of a Christchurch 
transport plan were expressed by the N.R.B. in an article in 
The Press 28th August, 1957, p. 16. 
13. See Thompson (1973) pp.32-6. 
that provisions for public transport were being left to the later 
detailed design stage. In any case, they continued, the bus service 
would benefit greatly from the improvement in terms of travel speed, 
14 the motorway system offered. 
The second group of objections directed against the Plan were, 
47 
however, not so easily dismissed. They derived primarily from the one 
source - the City Planning Study Group (C.P.S.G.). This body was made 
up of a number of business and professional people whose self-appointed 
task was to examine the M.T.P. proposals. 15 They were soon to regard 
themselves as the virtual guardians of the Central City, 16 and in this 
capacity they conducted their own assessment of the traffic situation 
and the M.T.P., and produced their own alternative set of recommendations. 
The C.P.S.G. 's alternative plan was presented in local newspapers 
in February 1963, 17 and was based on different planning beliefs than 
those of the Traffic and Transport Committee. The Group was, however, 
by no means anti-motorway. They announced their agreement in principle 
with the roading proposals for the suburban areas of the city and 
18 also the North-South bypass role for the motorways. Where 
principally they differed was in the treatment of the Central City 
between the four avenues. The C.P.S.G. called for a moderation of the 
plan's effects on the central "precinct", arguing for the removal of 
the M.T.P. motorway proposals from this area. Their scheme (see 
Figure 3.41 suggested the Northern motorway line should be moved to 
Fitzgerald Avenue, whilst the remaining three "avenues" (Bealey, 
Moorhouse and Deans) be converted to a six-lane ring road. From this 
the central precinct could be fed by a system of one-way collector 
14. M.T.P. Report No. 66 (April 1964) pp.29-30. (See also C.R.P.A. 
(1962) p.35.) 
15. The Press 16th February 1963, p.10. 
16. The Group was transformed in the later 1960's into the Civic Trust. 













Source: The Press (15.2.63) 
Figure 3.4 C.P.S.G. alternative transport plan 
48 
roads, whilst remaining precinct streets should be turned in cul-de-
sac's as a means of discouraging unnecessary traffic movement. The 
C.P.S.G. 's specific conern was the Central City however it also went 
further to reject the draft M.T.P. on the grounds of its lack of 
planning integration. Whilst the Traffic and Transport Committee 
had expressed concern for modal integration, the C.P.S.G. claimed 
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the result was a plan integrated only as far as traffic was concerned. 
What was required was a complete Town Plan in which aspects such as 
land-use, environment and asthetics were fully considered. As they 
themselves stated: 
"The Group would like to see the master traffic 
plan developed more toward the idea of 
neighbourhood precincts .... 11 lY 
The draft M.T.P. as it stood was an isolated project which might 
itself endanger a potential town plan by its narrow outlook. 20 
By the very fact of their ardent opposition and the production 
of their alternative plan, the Group had illustrated vividly - to the 
public and local politicians alike - that a choice still existed. 
The implementation of the C.R.P.A. 's proposals for the M.T.P. was 
not a forgone conclusion. 
Summary 
In Chapter 2 the evolution of the decision situation was outlined. 
This chapter has concentrated on how this decision situation was 
further developed toward the stage of final, Plan-solution production. 
The Outline Plan accepted in principle by the C.R.P.A. in 
September was intended as the means to 'solve' the predicted future 
19. The Press 15th February, 1963, p.14. 
20. Eng, (1967) p.78, reporting C.P.S.G. opinions. 
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traffic problem facing Christchurch, before it even arose. The M.T.P. 
was touted as the 1 best 1 option and implementation of its proposals 
seemed at hand. 
It was, however, at this stage this a possible opponent, in 
the guize of an alternative (C.P.S.G.) motorway plan appeared. 
This alternative plan is important in that it initiated a new stage 
for the planning process - that of political and public acceptance, 
it revived the attention on what was the best solution. In 
activating public opinion the C.P.S.G. proved that implementation 
of a plan was not necessarily a natural progression through the 
planning process. 
In Chapter 4, this study goes on to examine firstly the 
development of the debate over the M.T.P. and the effect this debate 
had on the Plan and planning process. How both changed in the period 




THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF PLANNING 
The controversy surrounding the alternative alignments for the 
Master Transportation Plan's primary road network was important in two 
planning senses. Not only had public opinion on the merits of the Plan 
been polarised, but the continuing debate on the motorway location issue 
served to slow down, if not actually stall, the process of planning 
itself. The politiking which was to develop rapidly during the years 
1963 and 1964 forced the Regional Authority into the position of having 
to 'sell 1 its proposals to the local councils and general public alike. 
Opposition to the Plan was founded in arguments of largely a non-traffic 
nature. Whilst this controversy continued to take precedence, new 
developments within the realm of urban transport planning itself were 
already beginning to crystalize - events which were to affect the nature 
of both the facility location issue and the broader transport plan. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN: THE CITY COUNCIL BAULKS 
The M.T.P. had been accepted in outline form by the full Regional 
Authority at a meeting in September 1962. This development was almost 
devoid of practical significance being merely a rubber-stamping of the 
proposal before its submission to local councils. As they existed, the 
outline proposals had no legal standing and did not even purport to show 
the extent of properties affected or monetary costs. Furthermore, up to 
this point the Regional Authority had failed to draw any firm commitment 
from the local' roading authorities and the N.R.B. as to whether the 
Plan was completely suitable to them. 
The dichotomy created in Christchurch metropolitan planning 
following the adoption of regional planning (1955) by its very nature 
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necessitated some form of local council approval of any regional plan. 
This was a direct result of the fact that the resources required for 
implementation of any such proposals were under local authority control. 
What was required was a degree of constituent authority consensus for the 
acceptance of a plan such as the proposed M.T.P. As the 1953 Town and 
Country Planning legislation inferred, plan implementation was vested 
firmly at the District level, the Regional Scheme could act merely as a 
guide. The needed endorsement of the M.T.P. had therefore presented 
the Regional Authority with an opportunity to popularise its planned 
solution to traffic needs amongst an increasingly curious public. The 
opportunity was however, seized by a more energetic opposition. 
As it was, approval from five of the six constituent local 
councils was easily obtained - two (Heathcote and Riccarton) had been 
completely unaffected by the most problematic motorway proposals. From 
the outset the major decision of importance was to be that of the 
preponderant council - Christchurch City - and it was to this body that 
the C.P.S.G. took its case against the Plan. 
to a 
Eng (1967) notes that the Planning Study Group had become united 
11 
••• minimal intention of forcing the (Regional) 
Authority to reconsider the Plan, to re-think 
the entire problem in a broader context. 11 1 
This 'broader context' was expected to involve the complete integration 
of land-use and transport planning to form an all-embracing central 
city plan. 2 They believed they could achieve this by provoking the 
widest possible debate on the M.T.P. issue in the City Council forum. 3 
1. Eng (1967) ,p.79. 
2. Christchurch Press, 15th February 1963, p.14. 
3. Eng (1967) p.88. 
The local authority councils had been asked to view the 
Outline M.T.P. as a complete proposal. The C.P.S.G. were prepared 
instead to focus opposition at specific points of concern within the 
whole plan. 
The Christchurch City Council (C.C.C.) had given tentative 
approval to the principle of the Outline Plan as early as February 
1963. 4 Concern with various aspects within the Plan, notably the 
violation of Hagley Park, had however, served to preclude formal 
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acceptance. Councillors were concerned that such an acceptance decision 
should not prejudice any opportunity for later opposition when the 
question of detailed plan considerations arose. 
It is in this latter respect that the City Council itself began 
to anticipate problems of detail when the broader view of the Plan as 
a whole was perhaps necessary. The threat to Hagley Park became a 
pre-occupation, the question of the appropriateness of the M.T.P. 
proposals as a whole became secondary. The Regional Authority, 
realising the City Council's dilemma, sought to amend the Plan's 
treatment of the Park. In an obvious political move, the April 1964 
Plan amendment proposed the use of Harper Avenue for the needed 
Fendalton motorway and an angled link to the Salisbury Street central 
motorway (Figure 4.1). By this stage however, the damage had been 
already done and the move failed to appease the Plan's opponents. 
Within the C.C.C. itself such virulent opposition was bearing fruit. 
July 1964 saw the Council's own Reserve Committee adopting the C.P.S.G. 's 
use of the four city belts as a motorway alternative to be put forward 
for specific council consideration. 5 
4. See C.C.C. comments on outline proposals, M.T.P. Report No.66 
(February 1964) p.10. 
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Figure 4.1 April 1964 Amendment to the motorway across Hagley Park 
Following a series of Council inspired public forums, and with 
newspaper comment running against the Plan, the strong possibility existed 
that the Master Transportation Plan would be rejected by the C.C.C. 
The C.P.S.G. played upon this situation. It proposed alternatives to 
the Rolleston Avenue distributor to the Southern Outlet from the City 
Centre. 6 The suggested alternative of using Montreal Street flew in 
the face of the Group's own philosophy of planning Central Precincts 
where cars were not left to dominate the environment (the Montreal 
Street proposal cut through its 'river precinct'). The suggestion was 
however, floated to add further to mounting pressure. 7 
6. Christchurch Press, 21 August 1964. 
7. C.P.S.G. 'admission in Eng (1967) p.89. 
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As it was, the time factor was clearly on the side of the C.P.S.G. 
and those calling for a planning reconsideration. The political climate 
was unfavourable meaning a delay in the process of early, detailed 
development of the Outline Plan. The planning climate was also 
experiencing the winds of change. Urban transport planning methodologies 
were being seriously questioned in a British publication ''Traffic in 
Towns" (1963). Coming as it did in the middle of the Christchurch debate, 
and bringing a further conceptual input to post-war traffic planning, 
this document was to provide further ammunition for those concerned 
with the M.T.P. 's basic planning principles. 
TRAFFIC IN TOWNS: BUCHANANISM STATED 
The report on "Traffic in Towns" was the product of a British 
Ministry of Transport working party charged with investigating 
11 
••• the long term development of roads and 
traffic in urban areas and their influence 
on the urban environment. 11 8 
The working party, led by Colin Buchanan (hence the Reports more popular 
title as the ~'Buchanan" Report) identified the prime issue facing traffic 
planning as being how to commit resources to the re-modelling of urban 
areas for the accommodation of different levels of vehicular access. 9 
"Traffic in Towns" was intended to be a long-term aid to policy-makers, 
and the approach it adopted was based on design considerations. As such, 
the Report did not come out in wholesale opposition to large scale 
roading proposals. Instead a change in emphasis for the urban transport 
planning process was advocated with the highlighting of the importance 
of the urban environmental factor. The Report had expressed concern at 
a fall in environmental standards relative to increasing accessibility 
8. Great Britain Ministry of Transport (1963) p.7. 
9. Starkie, D. The Motorway Age (1982) p.37. 
and proposed a 11 bottom-up 11 planning solution through integrated town 
plans. 11 Traffic architecture 11 - or 11 The art or science of arranging 
buildings for efficient circulation and good environment 1110- was the 
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means advocated to meet the divergent needs of movement and environment. 
Buchanan himself adopted the analogy of the internal workings of a large 
building to explain these concepts. 11 In both situations occupiable 
spaces had to be arranged in relation to the corridors of circulation. 
The environmental area (urban 11 room 11 ) formed the foundation of the 
proposed planning technique. The function of the urban traffic network 
was defined as servicing environmental areas - areas where safety and 
aesthetic values were held paramount and, while skilful applications of 
traffic architecture might raise the acceptable level of traffic, a 
maximum ceiling or absolute limit still existed. 
The 11 acceptable 11 environmental standard also dictated the size 
of the environmental area. 
11 
... it is desirable to subordinate traffic 
movement to the environment and exclude 
entirely the cross-filtration of extraneous 
traffic. 11 12 
The resultant cellular structure of the basic planning units (environmental 
areas) could dictate the form of the canalised road network (Figure 4.2). 
The technique was bottom-up in the sense that the network of routes 
was subordinate to local needs. 
This change of focus for urban transport planning in general was 
important in that it re-emphasised the true advantage of canalisation. 
Two factors were deemed necessary for the effective application of the 
canalisation technique when it was first introduced in the 1940's. 13 
10. Buchanan~ Williams (1961) p.8. 
11. Ibid, pp.5,..6. 
12. Buchanan and Partners (1966) p.16. 
13. Tripp (1942) - One of the more notable applications of canalisation 
was in Abercrombie's "County of London Plan". (Abercrombie, 1943). 
Source: Great Britain Ministry of 
Transport (1963) p.44. 
Figure 4.2 The principle of a road hierarchy and 
environmental areas 
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One, the positive attractant force, had long been adopted in most traffic 
plans (e.g. motorway arterial routes in Christchurch) but the second was 
a ~ess recognised option. This involved a negative or repulsive force 
to direct traffic onto the hierarchical network. The practical ap11lica-
tion of these concepts all-too-often ignored the need for the latter 
force. In this ltght Hart (1976) has noted 
11 
••• the Buchanan approach could be viewed less 
as a new departure and more as a logical 14 extension of long dominant planning principles ... 11 
In other senses also the Buchanan technique expressed in "Traffic 
in Towns'' might be regarded as traditionalist planning. The 
conception of the future motorised city and attempts to avoid congestion 
14. Hart, D.A. (1976) p.93. 
related 1 strangulation 1 of old urban forms was one aspect. The 
Buchanan technique advocated protection of existing urban forms in 
face of the alternative of auto-inspired sprawl. 11 Traffi c in Towns 11 
recognised that the traffic problem was only a symptom of a greater 
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·urban ill - the outdated structure of most cities. As such the Report 
was not limited to a solely traffic orientated solution, advocating the 
integration of the varied elements of town planning instead. The 
dispersive influence of motor vehicles had to be controlled through a 
package of urban planning policies. The Report therefore proclaimed 
the virtues of Green Belts, and Development Controls to keep urban areas 
compact; new towns to syphon off excess populations; 15 maintenance 
of a central focal point for the concentration of urban activities and 
the environmental protection of such areas; 16 and the establishment 
of large-scale governmental bodies to undertake such a comprehensive 
planning task. 17 With the articulation of these planning principles 
the Buchanan approach had extended the scope of the urban transport 
planning process. Urban transport planning was freed from its past 
over-emphasis on purely traffic based answers, and set to incorporate 
broader considerations. 
BUCHANANISM IN CHRISTCHURCH 
As outlined above (pp.51-55) the political wrangling accompanying 
the acceptance of the M.T.P. in principle was long and involved. It 
had, however, also occurred at a vital time with the coming to 
prominence of the Buchanan Report. With this latter development the 
Regional Authority was again faced with the prospect of justifying its 
15. Great Britain Ministry of Transport (1963) pp.30-1 and 165. 
16. Ibid, pp.165-6 and p.197. 
17. Ibid, p .198. 
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traffic proposals, but this time against the Buchananist philosophy. 
With the C.P.S.G. managing to obtain a copy of "Traffic in 
Towns" in early 1964 and claiming that it endorsed their own objection 
to the local Plan, the scene became set for yet a further attack on the 
M.T.P. This attack was to be based on ideas expressed in Traffic in 
Towns and particularly its feature against "letting traffic dominate". 
The Buchanan Report was viewed by the Planning Study Group as being 
11 
••• the most significant and valid criticism 
ever brought against the Master Transportation 
Pl an. 11 18 
Northcraft (now in private practice in the city having left the 
Regional Planning Authority) had expressed the M.T.P. 's outdated 
planning philosophy in a local newspaper article in April 1964. 19 
She stated that the motorway design of the Outline Plan had been done 
in such a manner as to facilitate the development of precincts. These 
precincts had awaited determination in the detailed design stage of 
the planning process. This order of procedure was set in apparent odds 
to the Buchanan school, the philosophy which the C.P.S.G. now proclaimed. 
The Regional Authority's conception was, in the C.P.S.G. outlook, a 
reversal of bottom-up planning, and precinct planning could not await 
later development but must rather precede it. 
By late 1964 the M.T.P. debate at local authority level had again 
reached a crucial stage. The C.C.C. was forced to reconsider its 
approval in principle after the Reserve Committee's decision in mid 1964 
(see above p. 53 ). With the Buchanan report adding to the pressure for 
council re-consideration, a Special Council Meeting was set for November, 
1964. 
The issue confrontong Councillors at this meeting was approval 
of all elements of the M.T.P. In this sense it was a new departure. 
18. Eng (196l) p.108. 
19. Christchurch 11 Star 11 • 
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The past consideration had been with the principle of the Plan, now 
all matters were at issue. Eng (1967) also notes that the meeting 
marked another departure in that outright politicking, entered the 
debate. The council ls Citizen Party majority advocated the acceptance 
of the Plan as virtual 11 government policy 11 . 20 The Labour Party 
minority in complete contrast backed the C.P.S.G. 1 s option of a six 
lane ring road around the Avenues, claiming it to be up to date (in 
light of Buchananism) and less expensive. Voting along party lines 
was enforced, the Plan was again accepted but Plan opponents later 
succeeded in the passage of a resolution inviting the advice of an 
overseas consultant. 21 The resolution was drafted with reference to 
11 ... maximum possible needs of traffic and the 
welfare of the commercial community while 22 preserving and enhancing good environment, 11 
clearly the resolution was C.P,S.G. inspired and aimed at a particular 
consultant: urban transport planning 1 s man-of-the moment Colin 
Buchanan. He had been marked down as arbiter and whilst awaiting his 
judgement, the debate was stalled. Opposing sides apparently agreed 
to accept his findings, Buchanan was 
11 The expert beyond which there was no appeal . 1123 
Judgement on the Plan proposals could not be avoided - the fate of 
the Transport Plan was in the balance. 
The resolution had clearly been an open invitation for Buchanan 
to apply the 11 Traffic in Towns 11 methodology to the Christchurch 
situation. In his report to the Council 24 presented in January 1966, 
Buchanan managed to tread a fine path between acceptance and outright 
20. Eng, 1967, p.129. 
21. This was achieved by winning over Citizen 1 s Councillor 
P.J. Skellerup who was also Chairman of the Council 1s Reserves 
Committee. 
22. Buchanan, 1967, p.2. 
23. Eng, op cit, p.147. 
24. Buchanan and Partners (1966). 
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rejection of the M.T.P. His basic criticism mirrored that of the 
C.P.S.G. - the M.T.P. was only part of a limited regional scheme. 
This counted against the acceptance of the Plan proposals in isolation 
from a complete Town or Regional Plan. As might have been expected, 
Buchanan further reiterated his bottom-up planning philosophy, explaining 
that a complete town plan would delineate environmental areas. Since 
this had been lacking in the M.T.P. the relationship between urban 
rooms and corridors was at best, suspect. This was indeed a scathing 
criticism of the Plan. 
Buchanan however went further, and analysed the options proposed 
for the city's road network. This seems to be somewhat of an abandon-
ment of this own planning method. Whilst advocating a comprehensive 
view of town planning, his analysis concentrated on traffic proposals 
and, in specific spatial terms, those of the central city area. This 
reflects his task of adjudicating on issues of design from a Plan 
which was in Outline form only. Buchanan's philosophy had been geared 
to the planning process not the assessment of individual schemes. 
The further complication of political elements made Buchanan's 
task even more difficult and his adjudication in reality settled little. 
His definitive approval of the motorway's concept and the siting of the 
central motorway sections, was however, of major concern for the 
C.C.C. Acceptance of these by Buchanan in his report on the M.T.P. 
meant approval from the Council could follow - but the higher-level 
argument over the planning process remained. 25 
25. Buchanan and Partners (1966) p.54. 
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MOVES TO POLICY-PLANNING - THE REGIONAL MASTER PLAN 
In most respects it was the Regional Planning Authority itself 
which was to adopt a change of heart in its planning approach, and 
by dC!ing so resolve some of the problems raised in the 11 high 11 planning 
argument against the M.T.P. 
Recognition of the need for change in the Authority's planning 
principles were first expressed in late 1962, with the arrival of 
C. Barclay Millar to the position of Director of Planning. 26 This 
change of personnel was followed soon after by a review of the 
Regional planning position. 27 This set out the nature of past work 
the Authority had undertaken and its own conception of its planning 
role. The report proposed a broader base for the Authority's work 
and an extension of Regional planning into a wider range of areas. 
Whereas previously the Authority had concentrated on separate elements 
of a Regional Scheme (rural fringe and communications) the suggested 
modified approach sought a more complete picture. 
This change in emphasis was a reflection of developments within 
the planning profession. Barclay Millar saw the existing planning 
situation as being of limited scope. 28 The more holistic approach 
to the development of the Regional Scheme came with the preparation 
of the Regional Master Plan. 29 This represented not only the 
opportuni'ty for a broadening of the regional planning process but 
also the adoption of planning through expressed policy. In the past 
the Authority conception of policy had included the means advocated 
to reach an end (example, the M.T.P. as regional policy in 1962 was 
the programme for a suggested solution). In the new concept policy 
26. Barclay Millar replaced Nancy Northcraft as Regional Planner 
in December 1962. 
27. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 62 (February 1963). 
28. Barclay ,Millar pers.comm. (1985). 
29. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No.62 (February 1963). 
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was expressed as a clearly defined objective or end-state; detail 
of means and methods of achieving this were not incorporated as policy 
but rather were policy tools. 30 
The revision of the Operative Regional Scheme (1968) attempted 
·to cement in place this subtle conceptual evolution. 31 Both the 
need for an expressed written policy and the need for continued 
regional planning made up the first two Master Plan policy statements. 
The policy package (which was later accepted in full by the Regional 
Authority) also included such aspects as provision of recreational 
space for the future, the need to control urban form, examination of 
restraints on urbanization and the determination of urban form in 
face of future urban development and areal expansion. 32 
The specific reference to the urban transport component came 
however, in policy number three of the package. This expressed the 
need to inter-relate communications and urban development throughout 
the Regional area. The objective of this policy involved the 
maintenance of minimum levels of traffic service throughout the region 
in the long-term planning situation. For this the level of service 
determined by the Master Transportation Plan (Figure 4.3) was 
adopted. 33 A further feature noted in the communications policy 
adopted, was the incorporation of proposals for progressive revision of 








••• it is obviously necessary to continue to 
re-examine all possible modes of transport 
likely to arise, and all potential change in 
generation of traffic. 11 34 
Barclay Millar pers.comm. (1985). 
C.R.P.A. (1968) p.1. 
This was in many senses a recognition of the earlier "Traffic 
in Towns' ca 11. 
C.R.P.A., M.T.P. Report No.185, p.3. 
C.R.P.A., M. T.P. Report No. 92, p.1. 
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THE SECOND TRANSPORT STUDY BEGINS 
Adoption of a continuing process of planning for future needs 
had long been of concern to the Regional Authority (note, for example, 
the call for a plan solution which could be extended to meet needs 
beyond the original 1980 planning period - see above page 34). 
Added to this concern, the need for planning flexibility in the face 
of possible changes in forecast trends was also of paramount importance 
for any review. It was in this light that the review policy of the 
Master Plan was finally implemented. The October 1968 "Report on 
Continuing work of Regional Traffic Survey Analysis and Planning" 
had announced the need for a re-survey of the traffic situation. 35 
This was itself justified in regard to the age of the original survey 
data (now 10 years old and clearly obsolete) and with reference to 
advances in traffic planning which were eroding the assumptions upon 
which the original Plan had been based. 
The Second Transport Study was instituted as a review of the 
earlier M.T.P. data. It was not in itself a new approach to the 
36 city's transport problem, but adopted a similar system of surveys 
and procedures. Three basic objectives had been established for the 
Study. Firstly, it was to review basic assumptions on development 
trends which had been incorporated in the 1959 survey. Secondly, the 
Study was charged with determining alterations to the 1962 M.T.P. in 
the light of existing and future Regional development decisions. 
Finally, the Study had to look forward and examine future development 
policy options for the Christchurch Region and their transport 
. 1. t' 37 imp ica ions. 
35. C.R.P.A., M.T.P. Report No. 150, p.2. 
36. M.T.P. Report No. 155 (April 1969) p.1. 
37. Ibid. 
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The review was intended to correct the deficiencies of the 
earlier surveys and Outline Plan which had been exposed in the years 
since their completion. In outlining the nature of the Second 
Study, Barclay Millar was himself to state 
"In the Christchurch case it is suspected 
that it will not be necessary to alter 
significantly the present development 
proposals in the region. However, there 
are less radical planning decisions such 
as the rate of implementation and 
priorities, variations in land-use 
densities, to be considered and some 
detailed consideration could well be 
given to the impact of revitalised public 
transport policies. 11 38 
At its outset therefore the study looked toward both the more distant 
planning horizons on the one hand and the issue of plan implementation 
on the other. 
This latter focus for the review may be considered to have 
derived in no small part, from the delays in implementing the Original 
Plan - due to the failure of the Authority to gain immediate 
acceptance in principle and subsequent financial difficulties. 
With this factor highlighted, the Authority had decided that the 1980 
planning horizon had become unrealistic to meet. Consequently, the 
period for implementation had been stretched a further five years 
(to 1985). 39 Whilst this move would reduce somewhat the predicted 
benefits gained from congestion free travel (by allowing congestion 
to build-up in some areas), it was necessary and justified in that it 
spread the burden of financial demands of the roading programme over 
a longer period. 40 The change in planning horizon, had however, 
not affected the process of detailed design planning. By August 
1968 this component of the planning process was largely completed 
38. M.T.P. Report No. 155 (April 1969) p.2. 
39. M.T.P. Report No. 115 (December 1967) p.1. 
40. Ibid. 
enabling the local roading authorities and N.R.B. to approve a twenty 
year roading programme (August 1968). 
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Initial survey reports from the Second Study were soon available, 
revealing that traffic congestion was spreading from the central core into 
the suburban extremities of the radial road network (Figure 4.4). 
My_ 
0 )1959~ intersection~ 
• 1969 190000 vehicles per ay == 19 59 roads with max. == 1969 volume 1 I N -· ·Vi 
Report No.176 
Figure 4.4 Spread of Congestion on major radials 1959-1969. 
68 
These results were however of further interest as they indicated that 
traffic was now diverting away from the city centre by adopting ring 
movements rather than the direct radial approach. 41 A further analysis 
of these results led to the conclusion that 
11 
••• the community now accepts a level of service 
far below that envisaged (in the 1962 Plan) and 
has now no chance of regaining the past ease of 
movement. 11 42 
Financial Matters and a City Council Change of Heart 
The financial commitment to the M.T.P. was still foundering. 
The Plan rested on local authority willingness and ability to complete 
construction to due dates. With the incorporation of a flexible three 
year rolling plan period for more immediate determination of construction 
priorities, the programme was deemed capable of meeting planning 
uncertainties. 
In August 1966, Barclay Millar had emphasised the need to implement 
the M.T.P. on the basis of steady rates of annual expenditure on both 
roading and property acquisition. 
11 Should unnecessary congestion occur in any part 
of the Christchurch region it will be because 
road authorities have failed (either in securing 
finance or in the determining of a policy in 
relation to priority and construction), to 
progressively effect the work and implement 
the Plan. 11 43 (emphasis added) 
Later, in December the following year, a further report was 
released which provided for five stages of implementation. 44 The first 
of these 11 development periods 11 involved works programmed for completion 
in 1970, with very little primary route construction. The second 
programmed period (1971-75) was to provide the first expanses of urban 
motorway, area wide traffic signal control and one-way streets for the 
41. M.T.P. Report No. 170 (October 1970) p.2. 
42. M.T.P. Report No. 176 (August 1970} p.10. 
43. M.T.P. Report No. 89 (August 1966) p.2. 
44. M.T.P, Report No. 111 (December 1967) 
central city (Figure 4.5). Period III (1976-80) involved the 
construction of the St. Albans section of the northern motorway, 
the connection between northern and southern routes at Waltham Road 
and a number of lesser works. Beyond this stage, two further periods 
were programmed. These lPeriod IV to 1985 and Period V, 1986 and 
beyond) would see the completion of the total picture, they however 
differed from the earlier periods in that these proposals were more 
tentative. This report was an attempt at realistic development of the 
M.T.P., (and was incorporated later in the 1971 Regional Scheme). 
11 The dates shown indicate the years by which 
works must be completed to ensure a satisfactory 
standard of traffic service. 11 45 
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Such a principle was however not to be adhered to. Once again 
the failure of the Regional Authority to gain full agreement - this time 
on the establishment of a fund for advance purchase of needed property -
in combination with a less than required commitment to the construction 
programme, meant only one-third of the programmed Period I works were 
completed by 1969. The commitment at M.T.P. funds to other roading 
projects by a number of authorities was cited in explanation. 46 This 
situation was further complicated by cost inflation. By 1970 whilst 
some ground had been regained, principal works were still 25% behind 
schedule. The Authority was now forced to defer some of its planned 
improvements until more funds became available. 47 
On the political front however, the will to continue to implement 
the roading programme wavered further. During Period I of the programme 
(1967-70), the Municipal local authorities had largely maintained their 
expenditure input to implementing the Plan. 48 This commitment from the 
45. M. T .P. Report No. 111 (December 1967) p.5. 
46. M.T.P. Report No. 181 (February 1971) p.3. 
47. ibid. 
48. Ibid, p.l. 
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Figure 4.5 Programme of principal road works Period I to V 
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major urban councils was however to receive a major setback in the early 
1970's, with the re-emergence of the motorway issue on the local political 
agenda. 
Again the major focus of concern rested with the sanctity of Hagley 
Park. The City Council's initial attempts to begin the building of this 
section of the major route network (from Harper Avenue to Salisbury Street) 
were halted in 1970 when it was realised that the reserve status of the 
Park required revoking. This could only be achieved by an Act of 
Parliament, and the legal process was slow and tedious. 
This legal delay was a boon for the anti-Park-Motorway lobby as it 
served to highlight the road-through-the-Park as an election issue for the 
1971 mayoral race. Labour councillor and mayoral candidate Neville 
Pickering - a chief supporter of the C.P.S.G. in the previous M.T.P. debate 
within the City Council some five years before - built his campaign around 
the major city issues of the time: the proposed Commonwealth Games Stadium 
site, 49 and the building of the Park motorway. 
When the people of Christchurch returned a Labour controlled council 
(albeit with a majority of one) and Pickering consequently became mayor, 
the political fate of the M.T.P. was again in the balance. As a complete, 
all-or-nothing proposal the threat to one component part (the Hagley link) 
jeopardised the traffic efficiency of the whole scheme. The C.C.C. 's 
rejection of the M.T.P. over the issue of Park 'intrusion', essentially 
deleted those projects within the City Council area from the Plan. In 
reaction the N.R.B. was forced to support the City's call for a complete 
re-drawing of the M.T.P. in its entirety. Director of Roading F.A.Langbein 
49. The 1974 Commonwealth Games were to be held in Christchurch. Mayor, 
and Citizens candidate for the post in the 1971 Election, Guthrie, 
had favoured Porritt Park as the Games track and field venue. 
Pickering and Labour advocated construction on a new complex at 
queen Elizabeth II Park. 
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in June 1972 announced the Roads Boards recommendation that the Regional 
Authority should start again with its traffic proposals. 50 The change 
of council and heart in Christchurch City had again questioned the fate of 
the long-term metropolitan wide traffic proposals. 
This political change of heart in Christchurch City came at a time 
when the winds of change were also blowing on the Regional front. Within 
the Regional Authority itself an opinion had developed that regional needs 
were being constrained by the spatial limitations placed on its activities. 
Being confined essentially to the built-up area surrounding the city, 
the effectiveness of regional growth control was hampered in that much of 
the rural hinterland which was the "region" was beyond the Authority's 
boundary. The move toward an extension of the Regional Authority boundary 
and thus the institution of truly co-ordinated town and country planning, 
was therefore to occupy much time and discussion before the change was 
eventually made in 1974 (Figure 4.6). 
The extension of the Authority 1 s sphere of influence, the economic 
and political change of situation and the various delays in plan implementa-
tion which be-devilled the M.T.P. works programme during the late 1960's 
and early 'seventies, could not go unrecognised by the Second Transport 
Study. While these changes had rocked the basis of the Study's planning 
environment, its task of survey and report had ground on slowly. Originally 
intended for completion by 1973, the Second Study received a two year 
extension of life. Ostensibly this was because of staff shortages and 
survey delays, 51 but almost certainlythe changes in the planning environ-
ment had affected this decision also. Increasingly, as the study had 
progressed, the situation in which planning was being undertaken called 
for a broadening outlook. Urban transport planning in Christchurch could 
50. Christchurch Press, 16 June 1972, p.1 and 22 June 1972, p.1. 
51. M.T.P. Report No. 182 (March, 1971). 
Figure 4.6 
Mt Herbert C 
Wairewa C 
Heathcote C 
The extended C .. R P.A. Regional boundary. 
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no longer afford to be isolationist or dogmatic, but had to be more open 
to outside influence (be it political, economic or administrative) and 
adopt a flexible outlook to the city's future needs. 
The Second Transport Study, by the time it had come to announcing 
its conclusions, seemed to have become somewhat more than the originally 
envisaged 11 review 11 • The results were awaited with some anticipation, as 
it was expected to provide a new outlook and return the urban transport 
planning in Christchurch back to an even keel. 
The tone of the findings were set very early on. Report Number 202 
(August 1974} on traffic service and network assumptions stated that 
"While all forms of travel have been investigated 
it is obvious that it is still the area of 
increasing vehicle mo~2ment ... where most of the 
travel problems lie. 11 
The problem apparently facing the Authority from the 1960 1 s had not 
changed. The Report confirmed the foundation of Authority road planning: 
the level of service policy objective was maintained with only slight 
modification. The programme of road network development was also confirmed, 
but in a somewhat altered state. Motorway locations were confirmed but 
a change of emphasis in the building programme had been suggested by changes 
in traffic movements. From the survey results it had become apparent that 
suburban roadi.ng was more required than the Central City components of 
the 1962 Plan. The traffic problem had appeared to have become somewhat 
reoriented from its earlier inner city focus - suburban development was 
the new focus. 53 
The needs of other transport modes had not, however, been forgotten. 
In its establishment the Second Study had been charged with re-examining 
the possible future role of public transport. This move was a reflection 
of a noticeable overseas trend away from highway and road development and 
52. M.T.P. Report No. 202 (August 1974) p.1. 
53. Ibid. 
75 
toward transit options. The results of the study concluded that public 
transport could only be a 11 junior partner 11 in total travel patterns. 54 
Whilst needing to be maintained to meet social responsibilities to the 
car-less groups, public transport could not greatly increase its role 
against the benefits of the car. 
Cyclists also received attention from the Study. The recommenda-
tion for the development of cycle-way networks 55 through the city was 
again a reflection of the Second Study's attempt to integrate all modes 
into planning consideration. Such proposals reflect a different approach 
to 11 integration 11 from that of the 1960's. In the earlier period the aim 
to seek the 11 best 11 solution had meant public transport and other modes 
seen as uncompetitive, were largely ignored. Their role in the total 
transport picture was recognised in the Second Study as was the need to 
plan for their continued development as part of that "total picture 11 • 
Finally, the Second Study had been concerned with the future of the 
Christchurch Region. The relationship between population growth and the 
need for transport planning was reasserted. 
The definitive conclusion of the report was however that the 
57 motorways in the city were still necessary. The principal issue 
remained, vehicle movement and only elements of this problem had altered. 
CHANGES IN THE PLAN PROPOSALS 
The 1969 Survey data had revealed traffic growth rates which, in 
general, had exceeded those predicted for the decade of the 1960's. 
54. M. T. P. Report No. 210 (June 1975) p.25. 
55. M. T. p. Report No. 198 (1974). 
56. M.T.P. Report No. 155 (April 1969). 
57. M.T.P. Report No. 202 (August 1974) p.2. 
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However, by the time this information had come to be assimilated in the 
Transport Plan, other factors (as indicated above) had drastically 
reduced the effectiveness of the proposed M.T.P. It was in this light 
that the Second Transport Study 1 s recommendations, proposing further 
reductions in the scale of the plan, were determined. Again this was an 
attempt at regaining credibility for the Plan in the face of the uncertain 
planning situation which now existed. 
In these reductions (see Figure 4.7) the proposed Period IV 
motorway network was changed considerably with the replacement of seven 
miles of central city motorways with the already installed Traffic Systems 
Management procedures. By 1975 (when the Study 1 s final recommendations 
were made) the City Council had already instituted a system of one-way 
street pairs and area traffic light control to improve the flow of 
traffic within the four Avenues. The success of this 11 management 11 venture 
was such that the inner city traffic problem had been relieved, and the 
central motorway provisions (planned to be in place by 1985) were thus 
abandoned. 58 
In all, some eighty kilometres of regional road improvements were 
deleted from the operative scheme and modifications suggested to the 
programming of Plan developments. 59 The summary report had itself 
concluded 
11 
••• the level of service now recommended can be 
maintained with a slower rate of programmed 
construction than that embodied in the operative 
scheme. 11 60 
In effect what was being advocated was the 11 stretching 11 of the 
road improvement programme in relation to the Authority 1 s population 
58. The motorway corridor designation in all central motorways was 
however retained as a future planning measure. 
59. Most notably in light of the increased importance of the suburban 
traffic component - see above. 
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Source: M.T.P. Report No. 210 (June 1975) 
Figure 4.7(b) M.T.P. Road Network after the Second Study reco~nendations 
forecasts. What this meant in practice was that the Period II network 
of the operative scheme, originally set for completion in 1975, was 
adequate to meet needs of a larger population. The original Plan had 
over-insured the road network. The completed Period II network was 
suitable to meet the demands of the expected 1980 population. 
. 61 Consequently Period III works could be also delayed some five years. 
The Plan's temporal focus was also altered. The 1971 Operative 
Scheme proposals had presented a programme in two parts, an immediate 
works period and more tentative future plan horizon (see above). 
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The new programme re-emphasised this move toward more incremental 
planning. 62 The setting down of a firm blueprint for a distant planning 
horizon which had characterised past planning efforts was further 
dispelled when the review proposed a system of three planning scenarios. 
The immediate task (for planning Period II to 1980) was to prepare a 
realistic list of proposals for implementation. The second scenario 
suggested probable needs for a balanced network to 1990. Beyond this 
the plan suggested possible alternatives only, arguing 
11 The network as a very long-term concept is no 
longer seen as appropriate. 11 63 
The Review was attempting to adjust the Plan to allow for a dynamic 
planning environment. Work at the completion of any single period could 
be left as final if trends indicated that traffic numbers would not rise 
significantly after that time. Each period was a plan in itself and could 
be a component of a larger plan. Previously the large plan had been the 
sole aim. Flexibility was now the key, (a move further vindicated with 
the realisation that the Second Study's delay had meant the survey 
results were even more outdated). 
61. M.T.P. Report No. 202 (August 1974) p.4. 
62. M.T.P. Report No. 210 (June 1975) p.41. 
63. M.T.P. Report No. 246 (November 1978) p.3. 
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In many ways this Second Study reflected the Regional Authority 1 s 
facing up to new planning circumstances. Change, in a number of forms, 
had affected the road programme and planning was adapting to a new role, 
in a time of economic down-turn. The Second Study can thus be 
considered as an attempted response to changing attitudes and externali-
ties, not the simple review it had been intended, and this was recognised 
in the general reception of its changes. 
Implementation of these proposals in Regional and district 
planning schemes was still, however, some way off. It was envisaged 
that the immediate planning period proposals could be incorporated in 
District Scheme reviews whilst the longer term plan proposals would 
await the Regional Scheme Review before being adopted. 64 In light of 
this situation ample scope existed for discussion of and reaction to 
the revised roading plan. This consideration was also able to be viewed 
in concert with the results from other Regional Planning documents 
which were becoming available at this time. 65 These latter documents 
were largely concerned with the nature of, and shape of future city 
growth (e.g. the 11 Regional Indicative Plan 11 , 1976, and 11 Form and 
Direction of Urban Development 11 publication in July 1978). From these 
complementary reports a number of growth scenarios for the regional 
future had been outlined, incorporating within them changes in the 
planning situation (i.e. slower growth, inflation and the energy crisis 
of the mid 1970 1 s). 66 
Reaction to the transport study report, often with reference also 
67 to its complementary counterparts on urban development, was favourable. 
64. M.T.P. Report No. 240 (June 1979) p.3. 
65. This reflects.the achievement finally of a form of integrated 
regional planning. 
66. M.T.P. Report No. 246 (November 1978) p.1. 
67. M.T.P. Report No. 240 (June 1979). 
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Report 246 "Current Developments" - in essence a review of the Second 
Transport Study itself - found little cause for concern. Despite the 
noticeable slowing of growth which had occurred through the 1970's the 
changes recommended in the Second Study were still applicable. The 
motor vehicle had continued to be the principal means of travel and 
needed to be planned for. Levels of traffic service were still at 
issue. The 11 do-nothing 11 alternative advocated by some commentators 
would represent in both Regional and Local Authority terms, abdication 
f . b · 1 . t. 68 o responsi ii ies. The general conclusion drawn by all body's 
concerned was that the need for effective planning had increased, not 
d d 1 t f th h . . 1 . t 69 ecrease , as a resu o e c ange in economic c ima e. 
The flexibility of the Second Transport Plan was similarly 
lauded. In view of the inherent uncertainty which plagued any planning 
process (a feature heavily underlined in view of the M.T.P. 's past 
planning performance) flexibility and more specifically planning time 
extension, were becoming more warranted than previously. Greater 
emphasis on solutions requiring less of a commitment was the vogue. 
Traffic systems management dominated this time of insecurity. 
Where the Second Study planners were most severely chided was 
with their writing off of the public transport option. The energy 
crisis had highlighted the advantage of this alternative. Clearly, the 
Second Study had not gone into the possibility in depth, but the dominant 
urban transport planning focus of attention was, by the later 'seventies, 
70 switching toward the role of public transit in the urban sphere. 
68. M.T.P. Report No. 240 (June 1979) p.23. 
69. Ibid, p.8. 
70. This received formal expression in the passage of the Urban 
Transport Act 1979, which placed planning consideration for a 
variety of modes on a firmer footing, and thus negated much 
crtticism of the Second Study on these grounds. 
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Finally, increased flexibility and the deletion of many of the 
more controversial aspects of the Original M.T.P. (namely the central 
motorways) from immediate planning consideration, made the Second 
Study a more palatable pill for concerned Authorities to swallow. In 
many senses it was a compromise to which the local authorities were 
readily willing to accede. Immediate period works were, as requested, 
to be included as part of District Scheme review (e.g. Christchurch 
City 1979, Waimairi 1984), and longer term protection for arterial 
routes were catered for in the Regional Scheme Review (1979). 
Despite changes in the temporal component, the Original M.T.P. network 
remained remarkably intact, the process of almost continuous revision 
of its programming had however moulded it more to changing urban 
demands. By 1980 a satisfactory Plan appeared to have been produced. 
Summary 
This chapter has sought to provide an indication of how change 
in the urban transport planning environment, affected the proposals of 
the Christchurch Master Transport Plan. The initial debate over the 
acceptance of the Plan in principle was, at the outset, couched in 
terms of a facility location problem. The Hagley Park motorway proposal 
served to polarise public opinion against the M.T.P. The Planning 
Study Group's alternative plan contributed to this but for them 
(the C,P.S.G.) the issue was deeper. Their concern hinged on planning 
practices - the M.T.P. was not the integrated plan the C.R.P.A. 
purported it to be. Rather, the C.P.S.G. argued, the M.T.P. simply 
advocated road network changes and did not consider other town 
planning needs .. 
The arrival of Buchananism onto the worldwide urban transport 
planning scene further changed the nature of the M.T.P. debate. 
Buchanan gave credence to bottom-up planning methodologies which the 
M.T.P. had not adopted. When called in to adjudicate on the 
Christchurch debate Buchanan was asked to apply his method to the 
existing plan, a prospect which was impossible in light of the 
methodology. 
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The mid 1960's however, also marked a period of change within 
the C.R.P.A. itself. The adoption of policy planning meant that 
finally a truly integrated approach was possible and not merely 
contained in the Authority rhetoric, as of old. The Second Transport 
Study continued with the theme of change. The plan-process had to 
continue and, whilst intended to be merely a review of past trends 
since the late 1950's, the Second Study steadily grew in scope. 
Changing traffic trends and technology, implementation delays from 
the earlier debate and financial problems, the City Councils political 
decision to scrap the Park motorway and finally the 1970's economic 
downturn, contributed to form a more complete reassessment of traffic 
needs. The review became a second M.T.P. Whilst it was stated that 
the problem had changed very little - being still one of vehicle 
movement - the solution proposed was itself altered. The subjective 
interpretation of the decision situation had changed as much as traffic 
trends, thus necessitating plan changes. 
In the following chapter the focus of the study changes 
somewhat to specifically address the relationship of the M.T.P. to 




THE M.T.P. AND URBAN ORDER 
As was indicated in an earlier chapter, (see below page 16) 
the Christchurch metropolitan area prior to the 1950 1 s had grown in a 
largely concentric pattern around its original centre (the area within 
the town belts). This development had been made possible by the 
topograhic nature of the city's site, and had been aided by transporta-
tion components (e.g. the development of radial public transport routes). 
The link between transportation and urban form was therefore identifiable 
in the Christchurch case, and in many ways the evolution of the M.T.P. 
proposals is a continuation of this relationship. Indeed, it may be 
said that the provisions of the Christchurch M.T.P. owe as much to a 
concept of urban organization as they do to matters of movement 
facilitation. 
A CONCEPT OF URBAN ORDER 
The problem of determining the pattern of urban growth in the 
Christchurch area had itself been the major cat~lyst in the formation of 
the Christchurch Regional Planning Authority in the mid 1950 1 s. Post-war 
11 unplanned growth 11 , particularly at the periphery of urban areas where 
land was cheaper, had committed local authorities to extending public 
utilities and resources outward to meet demand. In the case of 
Christchurch, such. concentric growth had covered valuable agricultural 
land whilst less attractive areas closer to the city centre were left 
undeveloped. 
Concern expressed at these trends and the need for conservation 
of productive farmland and public resources, culminated in the passage 
of the 1953 Town and Country Planning Act in New Zealand. 1 The 
Regional Planning Authorities which were established under this Act 
were charged with ppreparing regional schemes, designed as a 
11 
••• guide to public authorities and local authorities 
and all persons in relation to the conservation or 
development within the region of the public utilities, 
services, industries amenities and other matters 
dealt with or adverted to in the regional planning 
scheme. 11 2 
In the Christchurch case the regional authority defined its first task 
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as being the delineation of a 11 Rural Zone 11 - in other words the creation 
of an area surrounding the existing city within which planning regulations 
restricted the type of land-use. This move was a means to concentrate 
the city's future growth and to also ensure an orderly development of the 
metropolitan area. 
The decision to prepare the Regional Planning Scheme in Sections 
(starting with the Rural Zone proposal) is somewhat misleading as it 
tends to suggest attention was given to Regional problems in isolation 
and not in a broader holistic approach. This decision was made on 
technical grounds, in that the Authority had only limited staff and 
resources with which to attempt its 'regional 1 approach. From the outset 
however, the preparation of each section was to be disciplined within 
the broader context of the Authorities planning task. 3 This latter 
point is relative to the consideration of the Plan's second section -
that of transport and communications - which was brought to regional 
consideration in 1956, with the introduction of the proposal for a 
Chri$tchurch Master Transportation Plan. 
1. Ne~ Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol. 299, pp.743-4. 
2. Towrr and Country Planning Act 1953, Section 3(2). 
3. New Z~~land Roading Symposium 1971, p.43. 
Recognition of the need to integrate transport planning with 
the other elements that would make up a 1 Regional Scheme 1 was first 
expressed at the initial Traffic and Transport Sub-committee Meeting 
in August 1956. Regional Planner Northcraft asked Sub-committee 
members to think not merely in terms of transportation problems, but 
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to consider the effect of any Plans that may be formulated on the form 
of the city and the livelihood of the region 1 s population. 4 The issues 
of transportation and city development were thereby linked from the 
start. 
Initially the relationship between the transport planning of the 
Regional body and the organization of the urban area involved one primary 
problem: the present and proposed role of the Central Business District 
(C.B.D.). Indeed the issues of traffic movement and the viability of 
the central area were inseparably entwined, a feature highlighted in the 
nature of the M.T.P. 1 s original development. 
The process of data collection most obviously exposed this feature. 
Although the transportation plan was originally intended to encompass 
a metropolitan wide focus, the perception of the nature of the traffic 
problem in the Christchurch situation in some respects precluded this, 
as it incorporated a specific spatial focus - on the C.B.D. 
The surveys conducted in this 11 Data Collection 11 Stage of the 
planning process concentrated largely on a defined Central Traffic 
District5 (see Figure 3. 1). Consideration of aspects such as parking 
provision,6 travel patterns,7 and traffic growth,8 concentrated attention 
4. C.R.P.A. Minute Book 11 Traffic and Transport 11 pp.2-4 (14th August, 
1956}. 
5. M.T.P. Report No. 20 (March 1959). 
6. M.T.P. Report Nos. 16 (June 1958), 17 (July 1958), 25 (October 1959), 
and 44 (July 1961). 
7. M.T.P. Report Nos. 31 
and 42 (July 1961). 
(August 1960), 37 (May 1961), 38 (May 1961), 
8. M.T.P. Report Nos. 18 (August 1958), 43 (July 1961), 47 (November, 
1961) and 49 (January 1962). 
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on the needs of the urban core to a large degree in isolation from those 
of the rest of the city. The traffic problem - expressed both in terms 
of congestion on the central road network and insufficient parking supply, 
9 was perceived as an inner city problem. In this manner, the M.T.P. 
survey process had promoted and maintained a largely traditional view 
of urban organization with the needs of the C.B.D. assuming a dominant 
role. 
The product of the planning process - the outline plan prepared 
tn the early 1960's - was to become a further reflection of this 
established urban concept. As Eng (1967) notes: 
"In a fundamental sense the Plan is more than a 
roading plan but rather a plan for the optimum 
use, by an expanding regional p~Bulation of the 
facilities of the city centre. 11 
The proposed motorway network was intended to concentrate activity on 
the city centre via the adoption of what the planners termed the 
'tangential approach' . 11 This basic tangential concept involved the 
deveolopment of a framework of important traffic routes serving the 
C.T.D. In this manner the investment in urban traffic facilities for 
Christchurch was serving to complement the already existing pattern of 
capital investment concentrated as it was on the C.B.o. 12 
The proposed parking provision component of the outline plan was 
to be a foil to this. It in turn reflected the dominant role accorded 
the centre. While no specific recommendations were made in the outline 
plan in regard to parking terminals, their requirement and possible 
location were recognised. 13 The basic aim of the final outline plan was, 
9. Johnston (1965) notes that a shortage of central city parking would 
" ... precipitate the decline of central retailing to an extent both 
harmful and undesirable for the whole community." (p.160) 
10. Eng (1967) p.61. 
11. C.R.P.A. (1962) pp.24-26. 
12. Christchurch Press, 1 July 1961. 
13. Refer above to Footnote 6. 
therefore, that the proposals should make it 
11 
••• no more difficult to travel to the city 
centre than elsewhere ... 11 14 
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The city centre should retain its dominant position in the urban make-up, 
with parking and other facilities being provided accordingly. 
The maintenance of existing movement patterns within the urban 
area was clearly the principle upon which the Plan was based. It had 
become apparent that the Regional Authority was promoting an established 
urban prescription. The 1962 Outline Plan in attempting to co-ordinate 
with the existing Regional Scheme, 15 was itself also intended to assist 
the programming of future growth alternatives for the Christchurch urban 
area. 
In such a context, it may seem something of an irony that in 
planning for the car the M.T.P. also promoting an urban form whose 
demise had been largely automobile inspired. The rise of the car had 
reduced the primacy of the central city in terms of urban organization. 
The M.T.P. had adopted at one and the same time the car and a traditional, 
centralised concept of urban order. The success of such a measure would 
itself lie in strict planning control and the successful development of 
the whole Plan network. 
POLICY PLANNING AND THE EXPANSION OF THE URBAN ORDER CONCEPT 
The mid-1960's marked a period of considerable change in planning 
concepts and the administration of regional planning in Christchurch. 
With the M.T.P. opponents of its provisions were expounding precinct 
philosophies and the virtues of Buchananism. Added to this, the 
arrival of the new Regional Planner, Barclay Millar, brought a new 
14. C.R.P.A. (1962) p.36. 
15. C.R.P.A. Regional Scheme Section One, Rural Zone, 1959. 
approach to the planning process. This was also to be a time in which 
the role of transportation planning in the spatial organization of the 
Christchurch region was further developed. 
Buchanan 1 s call for the more complete integration of transport 
and town planning through the adoption of a 
11 
••• bundle of traditional planning 
prescriptions ... 11 lb 
was received by a surprisingly receptive audience in the C.R.P.A. 
Whilst groups such as the C.P.S.G. had concentrated on the M.T.P. 1 s 
negative aspects in relation to the Buchanan 11 revolution 11 , 17 the 
Regional Authority had begun to turn its attention to the role of the 
M.T.P., and indeed regional planning, in the local urban scene. 
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Publication in February 1963 of the 11 Synopsis of the Planning 
Position 11 marked the beginning of the process of redefining the role of 
regional planning in Christchurch. It was realised that whilst the 
C.R.P.A. 's intended aim was to produce one comprehensive regional scheme, 
it had tn fact gone about the task in a piecemeal manner. Regional 
objectives had never been completely expressed as an entity. The 
production of a Regional Master Plan (completed in 1967), with its 
broadened range of specifically expressed policies, was intended to 
redress this 11 oversight 11 • The isolated approach to individual urban 
problems - originally the product of manpower shortages in the 1950 1 s, 
but which had continued to characterise regional planning - was now 
l d b f k f . t t d l . . 18 rep ace ya ramewor o 1n egra e po 1c1es. 
With this change the nature of regional planning became more 
directly prescriptive. Whereas prior to the Master Plan prescription 
16. Hart (1976) p.99. 
17. Notably the to~-down rather that bottom-up planning technique 
(see above p. 55-58). 
18. The Regional Master Plan was formerly incorporated into the 
Regional Scheme as part of the Planning Data volumes -
C. R. P , A. (1968) . 
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had only been a vague, implied objective of the Regional Scheme, 
consisting solely of zoning recommendations, the new programme 
expressed a different approach. Policy Report Number 7 in the Master 
Plan ("The Needs of Urban Form 11 ) 19 was an attempt to succinctly 
e~tablish the parameters of the Regional Planning task. This Report 
concentrated on the demand for land for living purposes as its planning 
focus. 20 It argued that such a demand found expression in three forms: 
"amount, distribution and the question of when it was needed". 
11 Amount 11 was to be a key parameter in the planning task. This was 
dependent on factors such as population forecasts, the range of land 
uses required for the home, work and play activities of the population 
and the density at which such activities would take place. In their 
turn 11 distribution" dealt with the apportionment of regional land area 
needed for each respective land-use, and 11 when? 11 addressed the planning 
horizon to work toward. It was within this context that the other major 
regional policies - protection against sprawl, matching development to 
communications, the provision of recreational space and recognition of 
11 urban" and 11 rural 11 activities - were to operate. Good planning was 
21 essential to the final product. 
The first technical report associated with this Policy22 
delineated the population range within which the regional scheme 
programme would operate. In assessing the future population (to the 
twenty year planning horizon ending 1986) a range of possibilities was 
determined (see Figure 5.1). This provided the initial parameters for 
the future urban development of the Christchurch region. 
19. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 78. 
20. Ibid, p.1. 
21. Ibid, p.3. 
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Figure 5.1 C.R.P.A. Population projections 1968. 
The distribution of the projected future population was a 
question considered separately (Policy No. 8 - Form and Direction 
of Future Urban Development). 23 This policy was important to the 
complete package in that whereas all previous determined policies 
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had dealt with the avoidance of possible situations through planning, 24 
this policy addressed a specific prescriptive aim: directing the 
future development of the urban area. It was the objective toward which 
all other policies would be working, expressing a role for regional 
policies - that they should determine the particular general shape (or 
form) that development should take, before a specific plan was 
proceeded with. 25 The aim and objective of all other policies were 
thereby directed to answer a central question - that concerning the 
urban organization of the future Christchurch. In this respect the 
M.T.P. itself was subjugated to an urban order objective. The inter-
dependence of transportation planning and urban development was firmly 
established. 26 The M.T.P. now occupied an integral part in the total 
strategic plan for Christchurch's urban development. 
THE 11 TRANSPORT RESTRAINT'1 AND CHANGES IN 11 URBAN ORDER 11 
With the regional population expected to approach 400,000 by the 
mid 1980's and the explicit M.T.P. policy assumption that motor vehicle 
use remain unrestricted throughout this period, pressure on the road 
network seemed confirmed. 27 This served to highlight the nature of 
the restraint which the transport network could become in terms of 
programming urban growth - a problem the Regional Authority singled 
23. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 79 (March 1968). 
24. E.g. Sprawl ~Policy No. 2,5,6. Transport No.3, Recreational Needs, 
No.4, Restraints to Urbanization No.6. 
25. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 79 (March 1968) p.2. 
26. Ibid, p.1. 
27. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 86 (October 1967) p.5. 
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out for specific attention in the 1968 Regional Scheme. 28 
Three areas were established to act as a guide to district 
scheme planners when making developmental decisions. Each area was 
delineated by a proposed maximum level of traffic acceptability, 
measured in the number of trips per site acre per day (see Figure 5.2). 
The first, the area of "central restraint", was made up of the 
existing C.B.D. This was the area in which the largest number of 
trips per site acre per day were acceptable. The maximum limit was 
set at 700 trips per site acre. 
Area two included those areas immediately surrounding the C.B.D., 
which, it was suggested, were 
11 
••• subject to inten~e economic pressure 
for development .... " 9 
Made up of that area between Bealey, Fitzgerald, Cashel, Stanmore, 
Wilsons, Brougham and Antigua Streets (excluding the previously 
identified area of Central Restraint) this 11 inner Restraint" area was 
seen to be facing pressure for industrial development. If such develop-
ment occurred the maintenance of movement through the road system might 
suffer and the useful life of the programmed network improvements be 
reduced. This prospect suggested restrictions such that no more than 
300 t . •t d b . d 30 rips per si e acre per ay e impose . 
The final category of restriction encompassed the remainder of 
the existing built-up area. Being predominantly residential in 
character the "General Urban Restraint" would apply through this area 
to control the traffic-land-use conflict. The maximum limit was thus 
28. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 84 (October 1967). Also refer to 
C.R.P.A. Regional Planning Scheme: Section 2 Communications 
(1971) Subsection 8. 
29. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 84, p.1. 
30. Such a figure was approximately three times that recorded for 
the same areas in the 1959 survey. (Ibid, p.6.). 
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Source: C.R.P;A. Planning Report No. 84. 
Figure 5.2 Transport Restraints Plan 
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set at 60 trips per site area, which roughly approximated a population 
density of 40 persons per acre. 
The introduction of this planning categorization was intended 
to assist with the co-ordination of development proposals within the 
built-up area and movement needs. Such a schema again reflected the 
strategy of maintaining the Central City as the dominant focal point, 
as opposed to a more dispersive policy for the C.B.D. 1 s functions. 
The mono-nucleated urban form was still an important part of the 
planning philosophy. However, it was recognised that continuing growth 
in the central area above an ultimate limit would overtax the proposed 
network improvements and so lower levels of service. Thus trip numbers 
were to be restricted and to complement this a restirction on employ-
ment within the C.B.D. was recommended (a 70,000 employee upper limit). 31 
While such a categorisation based on trip numbers had essentially 
built out from the earlier transport planning focus on the C.T.D., 
there was some recognition of a more decentralised urban future. This 
came in the form of a fourth, less defined, category for development: 
the suburban commercial centre. The restraints plan implied that such 
areas should act as the loci for commercial and retail development after 
the C.B.D. had reached its ultimate employment limit. This may suggest 
the planning of some degree of de-centralisation and the adoption of a 
multi-nucleated urban form. However, this element can probably be 
considered to be more a response to an existing situation than a pre-
determined strategic move. Already by the time of the report's 
presentation (and its later inclusion in the Regional Scheme, 
Section II) some large-scale shopping complexes were beginning to 
31. Ibid. 
32 be proposed in some suburban areas. As the Report itself was 
to note 
11 The planning of suburban commercial centres 
is a matter requir~ng considerable study and 
careful design .... 3 
Their proliferation might significantly alter travel patterns. 
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Therefore, not only was the viability of the central city in question, 
but the attendant urban order and associated M.T.P. concepts based 
upon it would also be questioned. The inclusion of this 11 fourth 11 
category may therefore be a planning response to change, and a 
recognition that this change itself must be planned. 
Confirmation of the changing situation with respect to urban 
development was not long in coming. As was indicated in the previous 
chapter, the initial surveys of the Second Transport Study were begun 
in 1969. Smith and Mains 11 Ten Year Review" reveals that, in relative 
traffic terms, the central city's dominance was being reduced. The 
1959 traffic survey had shown that one-third of all vehicles entering 
or leaving the metropolitan area had stopped within the Central City. 
The corresponding figure for 1969 showed a reduction in this pattern 
to only one-fifth. They further cited the 
11
, •• marked increase in suburban shopping and 
employment opportunities. 11 34 
(see Figure 5.3) 
as the cause of greater growth of traffic on suburban radials than 
nearer the City. These results highlighted the growing role of the 
suburbs as traffic generators, which lead to the re-programming of 
35 road network developments discussed in Chatper 4. 
32. The first of the major Christchurch Suburban Shopping Complexes -
Riccarton - was opened in the late 1950's. Other similar 
developments were planned for Bishopdale and Northlands (Papanui) 
by the late 1960's. 
33, C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 84, p.l. 
34. M.T.P. Report No. 176, p.6. 
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98 
The concern for the suburban component of the ucontinuous 
urban complex 11 continued with the preparation of a further series of 
planning reports aimed at incorporating bottom-up planning into the 
M.T.P. The identification of suburban communities or 11 neighbourhoods 11 
within the existing urban fabric was central to this aim. This task 
was however quite involved, with the concept of an identifiable 
neighbourhood or community of interest being extremely subjective. 
In suggesting means by which these planning units could be determined 
the Regional Authority reports suggested suburban boundaries were 
delineated by a variety of features including the sea, estuary and 
river, hills and topographical features, the location of rural areas 
and open space, industrial localities and finally the principal road 
network. 36 
The bottom-up planning methodology (as espoused by Buchanan in 
Traffic in Towns) had called for roads to be programmed to the 
localities needs. The method adopted in the M.T.P. however - and 
apparently the reason for the reports themselves - was largely to 
programme suburban communities around the already planned road network. 
In this the Authority was only paying lip-service to suburban needs -
trying to up-date its out-dated planning methodology. 
Buchanan himself in "Planning in Christchurch: A Review 11 had 
called for 
11 
••• a full scale network and environmental study 
of the whole urban area .... 11 37 
to delineate such suburban localities. However, the regional authority 
and constituent councils restricted their approach on this matter. 
The acceptance of the M.T.P. road network and its continued 
maintenance as regional policy during the preparation of suburban 
36. M.T.P. Report No. 194 (October 1972) pp.2-3. 
37. C.D. Buchanan and Partners, 1966, p.54. 
locality studies, precluded an open approach. In essence, whilst 
stating that all factors of local suburban needs were taken into 
38 account when final selection of the principal network was made, 
the Authority was essentially promoting a 11 blueprint 11 planning 
attitude to the rooms and corridors question. Communities were 
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programmed to fit the needs of the whole traffic network (Figure 5.4). 
The decision on the form of the road network had been made - those in 
suburban localities would have to work around this. 
TRANSPORT AND URBAN ORDER: THE LONGER-TERM 
The relationship between transportation and urban order in the 
Christchurch situation was to also reflect a 11 new 11 regional perspective 
following the introduction of the Master Plan. The Christchurch 
11 sphere-of-influence 11 had itself begun to alter significantly, and 
in response the spatial boundaries of regional thinking and planning 
were to expand accordingly. 
From its very beginnings the Regional Planning Authority had 
been 1 programmed 1 into thinking about the needs of the area within the 
urban fence 39 as its foremost concern. Attention had been concentrated 
on planning for growth within the existing urban area. Regional 
planning of urban functions (such as industries, specialist retailing, 
commerce and residential subdivision) was intent on directing such 
development to up-used areas within the boundary of the built-
environment. Indeed, in this respect, the Authority had estimated 
that a population of 400,000 people, with all their attendant land-use 
requirements could be accommodated within the urban fence through the 
38. M.T.P. Report No. 194, p.3. 
39. The 'urban fence' had been formally defined in the 1959 Regional 
Scheme Rural Section as the inner boundary of the rural zone. 
The rural zone was to later become a Green Belt surrounding the 
city - 1971 Regional Planning Scheme. 
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Figure 5.4 Regional Roads and Suburban Localities. 
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continued maintenance of the mono-nucleated city form. 
The earliest recognition of the limitations of such a policy 
of concentration was, however, embodied in the rhetoric of the 
Master Plan Reports themselves. These had identified the possibility 
·of density congestion on the road network as a future problem. 
11 
••• the trend toward intense traffic generating 
zones must be arrested and consequently a 
general restraint exists within the present 
internal areas. 11 
The amelioration of such a situation was seen to lie in a 11 sound 
town planning scheme 11 • 40 While the needs of the predicted 1986 
population could be met within the urban fence any further growth 
beyond this would have to be planned for accommodation elsewhere. 
It was in such a context that the 11 Restraint on Urbanization 11 
(Policy No.6}. had been established and, in the transport sense, two 
levels of restraint were determined (Figure 5.5). Where transport 
imposed a 11 permanent 11 restraint any development would be deemed to 
prejudice the efficient functioning of the proposed full M.T.P. 
network. 11 Variable restraint 11 however, existed in some areas - being 
dependent upon what stage the roading programme had been developed 
to, at any one time. Beyond these definitions however, questions 
remained as to how the road system and M.T.P. could be best utilized 
in the longer term. 
The M.T.P. had itself been planned in an environment where 
urban sprawl was to be avoided. The late l960 1 s and early 1970 1 s 
however marked a change in the planning focus in that the planners 
began to look beyond the needs of the immediate infilled urban area. 
Regional planning began to look beyond the existing Christchurch 
11 Regi on 11 • It had become 
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Figure 5.5 Transport Restraints - Contiguous external areas. 
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11 
••• necessary to establish a method of breaking 
away from the present to produce a more worth-
while pattern of development, level of traffic 
service qnd community satisfaction in the 
future. 1141 
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The call was away from the repetitive planning task of the past and 
toward directive planning. The task now was to stimulate a new form 
of urban growth and redetermine the nature of the urban order. 
The determination of the various options for the direction of 
this future growth was a task of enormity both in the economic and 
political sense. The role of the transportation network (existing 
and planned) in this process was recognised and received expression 
in the terms of reference given the second transport study. 
Objective III was to 
11 Study the transportation implications of possible 
future development policies that appear feasible ... 
for the wider region, 11 42 
This was further enlarged by the realisation that improvement to the 
transport infrastructure would act as a major tool of public investment, 
assisting in the achievement of the appropriate planned urban form. 
11 Transportation and improvements in the road 
network are a major tool of public investment ... 
Used wisely this tool reinforces regional 
planning objectives. 11 43 
Questions of programming major regional road works became therefore 
interspliced with necessary decisions on the desirable distribution 
of regional population growth. 
The issue had been addressed earlier (October 1967) with the 
adoption of Transport Restraints Plan Number 5, which established the 
directions for the long-term growth of the city (see Figure 5.6). 
From this it was obvious that the major growth thrust was to be 
catered for to'the south-west of the existing city, whilst growth 
41. New Zealand Roading Symposium 1971, p.48. 
42. See M.T.P. Report No. 202 (August 1974) p.3. 
43. See M.T.P. Report No. 210 (June 1975) p.8. 
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Figure 5.6 Directions for long-term urban growth. 
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in the south (toward Lincoln) and north (Kaiapoi and Rangiora) was 
to be more restricted. 
The direction that any future development would take was 
1 f . t t 44 a so o in eres . Growth in the urban periphery had been ruled out 
largely by the urban fence policies. The Authority was more concerned 
to establish a limited number of growth corridors and cited the 
Voorhees Study of Canberra as an example for Christchurch to follow. 45 
This study had suggested the directing of employment away from the 
central area (so that the growth areas provide an increasing propor-
tion of total employment - consistent with the ceiling on central city 
employment - see above), and that motorways be used to attract 
longer trip traffic and syphon it away from areas of intense traffic 
generating capabiility. In such a manner the tangential approach of 
the earlier M.T.P. was reaffirmed and policy consistency maintained. 46 
The adoption of Rolleston as the major regional growth point 
in the early 1970 1s was to receive much attention on the political 
47 scene throughout the decade. The proposal was dependent on 
significant levels of growth in the region and the economic downturn 
accompanying the oil shocks of the 1970's had served to arrest these 
trends. The longer term growth horizon had become more distant. 
And it was to be this factor of the regional rate of growth 
which was indeed to determine the accuracy and necessity of the long-
term urban development plans as the decade of the 1970 1 s drew to a 
close. Politics had played its role in determining the fate of 
proposals for the 11 wider region 11 but it was the recognition of the 
uncertainty of growth that called for the major reappraisal. Whilst 
44. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 112. 
45. See Douglass and Main (1971) pp.13-14. 
46. Ibid, p.14. 
47. The Labour Government administration backed the proposal but with 
the election of the Muldoon Government in 1975 the Rolleston 
Satellite town concept was out of favour in regional development 
terms. 
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high growth rates had been experienced in the past and been expected 
to continue by the planners of the early 1970's, later reports, such 
as the "Form and Direction Report" in late 1978 proposed a more 
flexible outlook to the development future. Four options for 
population growth, described simply as "zero", "Low", "medium" and 
"high" were suggested, with the medium rate thought of as most likely 
to occur in the near future. 48 This medium rate provided further 
flexibility in light of planning uncertainty in that either extreme 
C"high" or "zero") could be catered to without major planning changes. 
The medtum range option itself indicated a turn of the century 
prediction for city population of only 360,000, vastly different from 
. 1 . t 49 previous p ann1ng parame ers. This further suggested a population 
and land use pattern 
" ... not unduly different from (that of) the 
present city." 50 
For the road network provisions this re-evaluation had again 
redefined the nature of the needed M.T.P. Ths move to long-term 
planning had essentially divided the urban transport issue into two 
parts: that concerning the needs of the internal area, 51 and that 
concerning the development of the wider region. The M.T.P. had been 
required to expand spatially. This in turn was achieved by programming 
network improvements to development needs. With Rolleston defined as 
the "Growth point" state highway 1 to the south of the main 
Christchurch urban area was to be upgraded (an extension of the 
southern motorway). With this immediate development to the south 
48. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 238 (July 1978). 
49. M.T.P. Report No. 246 (November 1978) p.2. Earlier predictions 
(e.g. C.R.P.A. Planning Report No. 86 (October 1968) suggested 
a population of 400,000 by 1986, which translates into a city 
population of roughly half a million by the year 2000. 
50. Ibid. 
51. The city within the urban fence. 
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axed in the mid 1970's, the wider region transport emphasis shifted 
to catering for northern settlements and improvements to the routes 
to Rangtora and Kaiapoi. The reduction in the planning parameter 
largely negated the immediacy of these programmes. The spatial 
extent of the planning needs was again restricted. The M.T.P. was 
again confined to the original city. 
Summary 
Chapter 5 has sought to indicate how wider planning concerns -
notably changing concepts of urban order - were incorporated into 
the Christchurch M.T.P. 
Growth outward from the city centre and the associated 
development of radial transport links had resulted, at one and the 
same time in problems for transport and urban form. With much of 
the city's activity's concentrating on a central focus, the M.T.P. 
devised in the early 1960's reflected a single nucleii concept of 
urban order. As such, the major motorway links ran tangentially to 
the C.B.D., servicing the needs of traffic from the suburbs to the 
centre and vice versa. 
Delays in application of this principle and predictions of 
continued high regional population growth forced a long-term change 
in urban order concepts. Whilst some immediate growth could be 
accommodated inside the existing 'urban fence' growth over and above 
this would have to involve the development of satellite centres. 
Transport policy was necessarily a major part of such proposals -
acting as the links between the centres. 
Meanwhile concern within the internal area was also building 
up whilst implementation of the M.T.P. was delayed traffic patterns 
changed. Suburban shopping and commercial centres developed 
attracting traffic away from the more crowded city centre. The 
primary role of a dominant C.B.D. was being usurped. Both the 






This thesis has attempted to describe and analyse the evolving 
nature of the urban transport planning process in Christchurch. At the 
outset, three broad objectives for this study were outlined: to describe 
the process of urban transport planning, to identify the relationship 
between transport planning and urban development, and finally to assess 
how these two features have changed through time, in the Christchurch 
example. 
Chapter 1 introduced a model of the urban transport planning 
process which was to act as the study framework. This model presented 
urban transport planning, as an interactive circuit. 'Planning' was 
undertaken in the government domain, whilst the effects of plan decisions 
were felt in the community at large. This chapter ended with an 
introduction to the methodology of master transportation planning -
the approach to urban transport planning adopted in Christchurch. 
Chapter 2 went on to examine the evolution of the urban transport 
'problem' in the Christchurch case. It was shown that a physical 
problem did not indeed exist at the time planning concern arose. Instead 
a problem was perceived to be developing and had yet to manifest itself 
in the form of severe traffic delays. The planning process was therefore 
concerned principally with future demands. The Master Transport Plan 
in this sense marked a concerted attempt by local and regional 
authorities to pre-plan transport requirements - the aim was more 
problem avoidance than solution. 
The aim of this process, which was initiated in the mid 1950's, 
was to produce the 'best' possible plan and so avoid traffic congestion. 
llO 
The ctty was seen to be facing an imminent crisis of congestion if 
car usage trends continued at their existing rates. The rise of the car 
and inability of the existing network to cope with possible future 
demands was therefore perceived as the 'problem' - not transport as 
such. Conffrmation of these trends had yet to be obtained and this 
became one of the matn tasks of the transport survey and forecasts. 
Information on the existing situation could be projected forward to a 
planning horizon and so derive a picture of the possible problem. In 
attempting this, however, a number of traffic trend "assumptions" were 
made. Most importantly, it was assumed the number of trips per vehicle 
during the plan-period would be the same as that experienced in the 1959 
survey, and that the pattern of traffic movement would not change to 
any great extent. What such assumptions effectively meant was that 
the planners were inadvertently projecting their values and standards 
into the future - as the basis of their solution formulation considera-
tions. They were planning so that the future reflected their present -
that the transport experience of 1980 be no different from that of the 
late 1950's. The result was that these assumptions constrained planning 
by directing its course to car-based solutions. 
Indeed perception of the problem had always been couched in 
terms of vehicle movement. The N.R.B. had initiated the metropolitan 
wide transport study in Christchurch by recommending, specifically, 
large-scale motorway planning. This perception of a means to 'solution' 
was perpetuated by the planners' continual reference to overseas examples 
during the course of their decision-making. The contemporary trend in 
urban transport was to motorway construction and Christchurch simply 
reflected this. 
The methodology of master transportation planning acted to serve 
these perceptions. The aim was for a one-off, complete solution in a 
single plan; 'integration' was the key. The eventual product of the 
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planning process was to 11 be" integrated 11 both" modally (all forms of 
urban transport were to be considered) and spatially (by viewing the 
network as a whole). Whilst the assumptions on transport trends 
constrained modal considerations, the holistic view of the network 
constrained the spatial scale of solutions considered. Road widening 
and other 'piecemeal adjustments• were out of favour; new large-scale 
motorway facilities were seen as the best option. 
The element of 'perception of the decision field' therefore 
played an important part in the planning process. An apparently clear 
perceptton of what the 1 problem 1 was, and the best means to 1 solve 1 
it, existed even before the process of planning was initiated. This 
served to constrain choice. The plan solution outlined in Chapter 3, 
was produced after a series of decisions which effectively reduced the 
range of practical options to a minimum. This phase in the urban 
transport planning process was critical in that the 'rationality' of 
the M.T.P. method was 1 bounded 1 at the outset by these perceptions. 
Chapter 3 went on further by beginning to outline the nature 
of the public response to the proposed plan solution and the inherent 
value judgements on which it was based. The Master Transport Plan 
was presented as an all-or-nothing proposal - it was a complete blueprint 
for the 1980 transport situation. The alternative plan put forward by 
the C.P.S.G. in reaction against the M.T.P. was based on a different 
set of planning values - offering therefore a complete alternative. 
The question of different planning concepts producing different 
results which could be considered 1 best 1 solutions in terms of particular 
sets of values was examined in Chapter 4. This chapter assessed the 
effect that changes in the environment of planning in Christchurch had 
on the Outline M.T.P. 
Uncertainty is an inherent aspect of planning. Indeed, the 
role of planning may be described as attempting to reduce this 
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uncertainty. The first major change to affect the Christchurch M.T.P. 
came with the advent of Buchananism, soon after the Plan itself was 
published. The Buchanan change in urban transport planning - from top-
down to bottom-up planning - came at a time when the C.R.P.A. was being 
forced to justify M.T.P. decisions, and its planning method. 
'Integration~ in yet another respect, that of a complete town or 
'regional 1 plan, now became a planning requirement, and this was a 
change which the C.R.P.A. itself found necessary to implement (through 
policy planning). 
Changes in a number of other elements in the planning environment 
in the late 'sixties - notably the ability and willingness of local 
councils to implement M.T.P. proposals and changes in transport trends -
also meant the Plan appeared outdated. It was here that the process of 
review - the Second Transport Study - became all important. As a result 
of this study it was found necessary to adapt various features of the 
original Plan, to meet a new set of circumstances which were confronting 
local urban transport planning as it went into the 1970 1 s. The Second 
Study marked the realisation that the values and standards of the 1950 1 s 
had become inapplicable to the 1970 1 s and 1980 1 s. As a result, the 
'review' reduced the scale of the plan, changing its emphasis from 
central city to suburban needs. The plan process had adjusted its 
proposals such that the Plan itself became more flexible. Blueprint 
planning based on implementation by set dates was replaced by planning 
in separate development periods. Decision-making had assumed a more 
incremental nature. 
The fifth chapter continued with the theme of change, this time 
addressing more specifically the transport/urban development relationship. 
Previous chapters had outlined how the M.T.P. had concentrated originally 
on the needs of the central city. This, it was argued, was the result 
of the predicted pattern of future trip making - congestion was to be a 
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problem primarily affecting the central city and radial routes leading 
to it. Chapter 5, however, introduced another possible explanation 
of why the Plan concentrated attention on the C.B.D. The regional 
authority planners had attempted to integrate their Plan with a 
recognisable concept of urban order. This conception was of the 
'traditional city', dominated by one centre of activity - the C.B.D. 
The M.T.P. had attempted to maintain this traditional urban form in the 
face of forces of dispersal - the car itself and suburban sprawl. 
The late 1960's and the 1970's saw a re-evaluation of the concept 
of urban order. Not only were the suburbs becoming more important in a 
transport planning sense, but this importance was itself inspired by a 
decline of the role of the central city as Christchurch's commercial 
and retail core. The city had, during the 1960's, begun to take on 
somewhat of a new form. Suburban shopping centres were seemingly the 
reflection of a multi-nucleated form. About the same time, planning 
for longer-term urban expansion was seen as becoming necessary. Satellite 
centres to absorb excess urban growth were suggested and directing this 
growth through M.T.P. transport links became part of regional policy. 
Later, by the mid 1970's when population growth rates had subsided, 
such satellite towns became a more distant proposition, however, their 
value from a long-term, indicative viewpoint, remained. 
How then, in the light of these results, has the Friend and 
Jessop process model stood up to the examination from the Christchurch 
example? The model organized the planning process into three clear areas 
of interest: perception of decision field, formulation and comparison 
of possible actions and the eventual selection of an action. In this 
case, perception.of the decision field was shown to be the most important 
element in selection of the type of response, whilst the separation of 
decision-making into three distinct components has been shown to be 
less clear-cut than the model suggests. The Christchurch situation 
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indicated that the task of formulation and comparison of alternative 
courses of action (and possibly even that of determining the final 
choice) were undertaken before even the problem itself had been 
clarified. This feature was most clearly illustrated by the adoption 
of new motorway construction and the alignment of these motorways. 
That they reflected closely the Suggate proposal of 1957 (tabled before 
the surveys were carried out), suggests that the planning process may 
have been less-well-defined than the model suggests. 
The other major point of difference between model and Christchurch 
reality is visible in respect of the element of change in the planning 
environment. The model suggests change is incorporated in the iterative 
nature of the process. Whilst this may account for some changes within 
the plan product itself, the causes of this change often derive from 
other forces, outside the limited realm of transport planning (e.g. the 
economy, politics, fashion). This dynamism in the planning environment 
pervades every aspect of the planning process (see Figure 6.1). While 
urban transport planning continues a number of 'externalities' may alter. 
As a result, the reason for planning or the ability to implement plan 
decisions may be affected. 
Finally, it has been shown through the course of this study that 
a rational, master planning methodology could not be applied in the 
Christchurch case. The attempted 'rationality' was itself based instead 
on subjective decision-making. Master transport planning itself became 
transformed by a variety of forces into a more incremental form of 
decision-making. Long-term blueprint planning is an almost impossible 
goal in Christchurch. 
The value of such large-scale, long-term plans however, lay in 
their indicative role. Master plans should act as an overall guide. 
Incremental planning should direct the actual course of implementation. 
This thesis has examined the urban transport planning process 
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from a single perspective: the experience of Christchurch. To provide 
a more accurate assessment - to either confirm the results of this 
study or, conversely, to show it as an exception which proves another 
rule - further studies of urban transport planning experiences within 
New Zealand and indeed worldwide should be undertaken. 
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